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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Some Theoretical Issues 
In the decades of the fifties and sixties development was generally 
equated with growth in per capita GDP (gross domestic product) resulting 
from net capital formation. As recently as the late I960's one of the 
major recommendations of the Pearson Report^ was a goal of 5% rate of 
growth per annum for the developing countries throughout the 1970*s. If, 
on the other hand, development involves not only growth in GDP but also 
to a wide spectrum of socio-economic factors relating to quality of life, 
then it seems obvious that while growth and industrialization (i.e., 
capital formation) may be a necessary condition for development it is not 
a sufficient condition. The ultimate goal of the development process 
should be to increase the quality of life for all of a country's citizens, 
not just for the richest 5%. While an economist may have no comparative 
advantage (resulting from his knowledge of economic theory) in prescrib­
ing what an increase in the quality of life may be, it is reasonable to 
expect that part of this increase would have to include an improvement in 
economic well-being. In other words all citizens should receive a share 
of the economic gains of growth. Since a high degree of inequality in 
the distribution of income (and other benefits of progress) is an 
^This report, "Partners in Development", was prepared for the 
international community at the invitation of the World Bank. It had been 
drawn up the previous year by a distinguished commission of experts 
chaired by the Right Honorable Lester B, Pearson and has come to be known 
as the Pearson Report. 
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outstanding characteristic of most if not all developing nations of the 
"Third World", development in the 1970's should, therefore, include an 
improvement in the distribution of income. 
At the Columbia University Conference on International Development, 
which was held in response to recommendations of the Pearson Report, 
G. K. Helleiner in speaking of growth and structural changes in Africa 
takes the following view. Even if the extremely poor countries in terms 
of per capita income such as are found in Africa were to achieve the 
annual 6% growth rate as recommended, the quality of life within these 
nations would not be improved unless there is a drastic improvement in 
distributional equity. He says "distributional equity is a key element 
in the quality of a nation's life; the more this is so where the poverty 
trends are extreme" [9]. 
"Income in the less-developed countries is typically characterized 
by a high concentration of incomes in the top ranges, with the top decile 
of income units receiving some 40-50 percent of total income" [3]. It 
has long been argued that a distributional pattern such as this may be 
a necessary price to pay in order to achieve a high rate of growth. This 
argument is based on the assumption that it is the wealthy who are the 
savers and investors and that "the inequality of income makes possible 
the accumulation of profits which is a necessary part of economic growth. 
It is argued that the typical pattern of development of the now developed 
countries in the nineteenth century could occur precisely because the 
marked inequality of incomes made possible large profits, which were an 
incentive to dynamic entrepreneurial activity and productive investment" 
[3]. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that benefits from a 
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high rate of growth would "trickle" down to the lower income groups 
through employment and multiplier effects. The rate of dispersement 
of the benefits of growth would depend in large part upon the labor 
absorbing effect of industrialization (assuming industrialization was the 
chief growth strategy). Experience has shown that technology imported 
from the developed world is highly capital intensive. The ençloyment 
effect and, therefore, the distributional effect of industrialization 
has proved to be disappointing in Latin America. According to 
Th i es enhusen 
... higher forms of industry are requiring fewer laborers per 
unit of capital and factories are replacing labor-intensive 
artisan shops. Thus employment opportunities, and hence in­
come earning possibilities, are now opening more slowly than 
ever [23]. 
If a country were to pursue a grcwth maximizing strategy then re­
distribute the benefits of grcwth by some means such as a hi^ly progres­
sive income tax, the "savings effect" would still have to be contended 
with. The magnitude of the savings effect depends upon the extent to 
which the marginal propensity to consume falls as income rises. If the 
marginal propensity to consume (MPC) were constant at all levels of 
income, redistribution of income would have no effect on total savings. 
However, if the MPC is smaller for high income people, then a redistribu­
tion of income will involve some sacrifice in savings and, therefore, 
growth. In this case there would exist a trade-off between growth and 
equity in the distribution of income. The policy problem would then be 
to weigh the benefits of an improvement in one of these objectives against 
the resulting sacrifice in the other. 
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A rf-f.ent ( ] ' j 7 0 j  attempt to neasure the potential savings effect cf 
income redistribution in four Latin American countries was made by Cline 
[4]. In this study the effect on growth of redistributing income in 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela is calculated under two redis­
tribution schemes. The first was a redistribution of income towards 
the level of equity found in England. The second scheme was a redistri­
bution of income so that the minimum income equaled one half the overall 
average family income. The results of this study indicate that for either 
scheme the effect on the growth rate of the countries involved could be 
substantial. The sacrifice in the rate of growth would be on the order 
of 1% for Brazil and Mexico and smaller decreases for Argentina and 
Venezuela. Cline makes the following qualifying statement: 
While one percentage point is a serious growth sacrifice, it 
might very well be a reasonable price to pay for a country 
growing at 5% with inequality so extreme that political insta­
bility is chronic. 
The arguments that have been presented above present improvement in 
the distribution of income as an alternative to growth or, at best a re­
sult of growth in the long run. Arguments up to this point for a more 
equal distribution of income are based on socio-political-humanitarian 
grounds and not on economic grounds. However, there are effects other 
than the effect on savings which should be considered also. 
As long ago as 1776 Adam Smith suggested that the growth of an 
industry is limited by the size of the market for that industry's output. 
The extreme inequality of income found in most Latin American countries 
today is represented by a substantial portion of the population being 
found in a subsistence sector which is for the most part removed from 
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the rest of the economy beca^fe of lack of purchasing power. The 
result is that the "economic'' size of one of these countries is much 
smaller than geographical sise, or population would indicate. In such a 
situation extreme inequality iii the distribution of income could be a 
deterrent to growth by limiting the size of the market. 
We now have two major effects of a redistribution of income to 
consider, both working in opposite directions on the rate of growth; 
the first being the "savings affect" which was discussed earlier and the 
"market" or "demand" effect which is being introduced now. 
Strassman [21] postulated an inverse relationship between economic 
growth and income inequality. He was concerned with the distribution of 
income because it affects the distribution of consumption. The reasoning 
behind this hypothesis is the following. "The low incomes of a large 
portion of the population ani very high incomes of a small minority have 
discouraged mechanization and a shift to mechanical industries . . . ." 
It is consumption inequality vhich causes workers to be channeled away 
from mass production industries and into luxury handicraft industries and 
personal services. A high decree of income or consumption inequality 
tends to keep the marginal efficiency of capital in the mass production 
industries low so that industrialization is retarded. It seems that the 
problem can be summed up in the fact that mass production industries 
need a large market in order to operate efficiently (assuming increasing 
returns to scale). Extreme inequality in the distribution of income 
effects both the level and the composition of demand which limit the 
size of the market for mass produced consumption goods. Strassmann 
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concludes that economic growth depends not only on capital formation 
and technological progress but also on growing income equality. 
More recently (1970) Thiesenhusen [23] proposed a similar thesis. 
His argument is based on the idea that although . . histories of 
Latin America's industrial progress over the past two or three decades 
can be filed under import substitution" s:>me Latin American countries 
are now facing a situation where it is becoming increasingly more diffi­
cult to carry out this strategy. Thiesenhusen explains. 
To date, domestic output ... produced with borrowed methods 
. . . has substituted for former imports and, in what has been 
called the 'easy' stage, pre-existing markets have been filled 
.... Because progressively higher steps in manufacturing 
usually require a larger scale to operate efficiently, many 
new lines began with a spurt but quickly ran aground. 
In summary Thiesenhusen states: 
One possible way to confront the current ejdiaustion of import 
substituting industrialization in some Latin American countries 
might be through policies such as land reform, which would make 
the pattern of resource and income distribution more egalitarian. 
This approach would tend to reinvigorate the simple consumer 
goods subsector since peasants would be able to make more pur­
chases. Subsequently, farm input manufacture would be stimula­
ted as campesinos attempt to add to their incomes. Government 
policy should be designed to capture increasing shares of 
rising incomes; these savings can be invested at growth 
points of the economy and in infrastructure. Eventually, 
production of intermediate and advanced manufactures will be 
able to proceed on a more efficient basis than presently. 
In response to the argument that private savings would be lost and 
therefore growth sacrificed he states that 
. . . with a more equal income distribution the added public 
savings could more than substitute for whatever private 
savings might be lost. 
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Guatemala: The Problem 
Guatemala is a small Central American country which lies just 
south of the Yucatan penninsula. It is bounded on the north and west 
by Mexico, on the east by Belice, to the south and east by Honduras and 
El Salvadore, and on che southwest by the Pacific Ocean. It is about 
the size of the state of Louisiana and has a population of about 4.3 
million people. 
The economy of Guatemala has been characterized as the "prototype" 
of a dual economy. A dual economy is defined as one where a dynamic 
modern sector exists alongside a traditional or subsistence sector [7]. 
The relation between dualism and the distribution of income is illus­
trated by a recent study which finds that the allocation of income to 
the poorest 60 percent of the population is related to the extent of 
dualism. The greater the degree of dualism the smaller is the share of 
income going to the poorest 60 percent of the population [2]. 
Dualism is most pronounced in the agricultural sector which is 
characterized by the continual existence of traditional large land hold­
ings (latifundia) and numerous uneconomically small land holdings 
(minifundia). This system of latifundia-minifundia is one of the con­
tinuing legacies of the old colonial system and subsequent years under 
dictatorships. The following statement would seem to apply to Guatemala. 
In those regions where the colonial agrarian system took far 
stronger hold, as in many Latin American countries, and where 
export industries served mainly to strengthen the position of 
the powerful urban classes, modem industrial development has 
in many cases been superimposed on the traditional agrarian 
structure. The result is a perpetuation of social inequalities 
which has given a highly distinctive coloring to the resulting 
patterns of income distribution, which are amongst the most 
unequal to be found [3]. 
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The traditional sector is made up largely of Indian farmers who 
make a living by working small plots of land in the highlands and supple­
ment their earnings working on the large plantations or in nonagricul-
tural activities. The term "Indian" is more than a racial designation 
but a cultural one as well. Indians are defined as those descendants 
of the precolonial civilizations inhabiting Central America who have not 
adopted the characteristic features of modern western culture [7]. 
People although racially would qualify as Indians but who have begun 
to adopt or have already adopted modem ways in such areas as dress, 
religion, customs, etc. are classified with the rest of the population 
as "Ladinos". According to the 1964 census of population, Indians con­
stituted 43.3 percent of the total population, which is an indication of 
the extent of economic and cultural dualism in Guatemala. 
The development problem in Guatemala has both cultural as well as 
economic dimensions, but the statement that "development in the 1970's 
must include an improvement in the distribution of income" would apply 
here. More specifically with almost 50% of the population made up of 
Indians, who are defined as being outside the main economy and culture 
and poor ladino farmers who make up the rest of the traditional sector, 
an improvement in the distribution of income in Guatemala would have to 
include development of the traditional sector. 
The objective of this study is to examine the effects of a more 
equal distribution of income in Guatemala. More specifically both the 
"savings" and "demand" effects will be accounted for simultaneously in a 
multisectoral model. The answers to two major questions are sought. The 
first question has to do with the gross distribution of income between 
n 
the traditional sector and the rest of the economy. More specifically 
"what is the net cost in terms of sacrificed overall GDP or income in the 
rest of the economy of increasing output in the traditional sector?" 
Two approaches will be used to answer this question: (1) The effects of 
lump-sum transfers to the traditional sector at the expense of the rest 
of the economy will be measured and (2) a "trade-off" curve in terms of 
income between the traditional sector and the rest of the economy is 
derived using a linear programming approach. In other words, the objec­
tive will be to measure the cost of developing the traditional sector at 
the expense of the other sectors of the economy. The second question is 
"what are the net effects in terms of the savings and demand effects of 
a more equal distribution of income within sectors?" To answer this 
question, a more equal distribution of income within each sector will be 
simulated, and the effects of such a change on the endogenous variables 
of the model are measured. 
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CHAPTER II. THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN GUATEMA.IA 
The Size Distribution of Inccane 
Data on the personal distribution of income in Guatemala are 
rcarce. No official data are published by the government of Guatemala, 
but GAFICA^ [25] presents some data on the distribution of income which 
were derived from data collected by the Social Security Institute (IGSS) 
of Guatemala. These data only include people who are participating in 
the Social Security System. This would include salaried workers and 
wage earners working for the government or larger companies. Self 
employed people who do not choose to participate in the program and many 
campesinos (peasants) who do not work on the large fincas are excluded. 
Most likely both very poor people and very rich people would be excluded 
from this sample. It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that the infor-
mation derived from this data would underestimate the degree of income 
inequality. This is because the poor that are excluded would earn a 
smaller percentage of income than their percentage of the population, 
and the rich who are excluded would earn a larger share of total income 
than their share of the total population. Table (2.1) presents percentage 
per capita income per decile of the population (deciles are ranked from 
low to high income) and also cumulative percentage figures. According to 
the figures given, the lowest 50% of the population in terms of per 
capita income receive only 12.7% of total income while the richest 5% 
receive 85.2% of the total inccane. 
^Group Asesor de la F.A.O. Para La Integracion Economica Centro-
americana F.A.O.'s advisory group for the economic integration of Central 
America. 
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TABLE 2.1. Distribution of income in Guatemala, 1968. 
GAFICA Data 
Decile of % Income Cumulative % Cumulative % 
Population in Decile of Population of Income 
1 0.5 10 0.5 
2 1.5 20 2.0 
3 2.5 30 4.5 
4 3.0 40 7.5 
5 5.2 50 12.7 
6 5.3 60 18.0 
7 8.0 70 26.0 
8 10.5 80 36.5 
9 16.0 90 52.5 
10 47.5 100 100.0 
Top 5% 35.2 
In addition to the data presented by GÂFICA it is possible to 
derive an estimate of the distribution of income in Guatemala frcm the 
income expenditure data reported in two budget studies carried out by 
the Institute de Investigacxoues Economicas Y Sociales of the University 
of San Carlos in Guatemala. These two studies, one for the rural popu­
lation [15] and one for the urban population [16], provide the income 
consumption data for estimating the consumption functions of the model. 
These studies will be discussed in more detail later. 
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The income distribution data resulting from compiling the data in 
these two studies are presented in Table (2.2). 
TABLE 2.2. Distribution of income in Guatemala (1966-69). 
Derived from budget study data 
% Families Cumulative Cumulative 
(low income to high) % Income % population % income 
34.0 6.2 34.0 6.2 
16.3 6.7 50.3 12.9 
12.2 8.4 62.5 21.3 
9.3 8.9 71.8 30.2 
10.7 14.4 82.5 44.6 
6.9 13.3 89.4 57.9 
5.6 14.8 95.0 72.8 
1.9 7.2 96.5 80.0 
1.4 6.8 98.3 86.8 
1.7 13.2 100.0 100.0 
Using data from the budget studies gives very similar results to 
those derived using IGSS data (used by GAFICA). The poorest 50.3% of 
the population receives 12.9% of total income while the richest 5% 
receive 27.2% of total income. The similarity of the results obtained by 
the two sets of data is even more striking when the income distribution 
data is represented by Lorenz curves, which are shown in Figure (2.1). 
The GAFICA data seems to indicate a slightly more unequal distribution 
13 
% Income 
1.0 r 
From budget studies 
GA.FICA 
.6  . 8  .9 1.0 .3 .4 .7 .2 .5 0 .0  . 1  
% Population (families) 
Figure 2.1. Ccsnparison of Lorenz curves derived from GAFICA and 
budget study data. 
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of income at higher levels of income than the budget study data- The 
fact that the methods used to calculate these distributions (i.e., 
random sampling and analysis of reported wage data) are different but 
give similar results increases our confidence in these estimates. 
The fact that 50% of the families in Guatemala receive only about 
13% of total income while the richest 5% of faiLllies receive about 30% 
indicates a high degree of income inequality. This is even more evident 
when income distribution data from Guatemala is compared with that of 
other countries. Figure (2.2) shows the Lorenz curves for Guatemala, 
Great Britain, the United States, Brazil and Mexico. The poorest 50% 
of families in the United States and Great Britain receive 23.0% and 
26% of total income respectively, while the top 5% receive about 18% 
and 13% respectively. 
Another measure of inequality of income, which is related to the 
Lorenz curve is called the Gini Coefficient. The Gini Coefficient is 
a summary statistic, which is used to measure the inequality of income 
distribution, that is calculated by taking the ratio of the area between 
the Lorenz curve and the 45° line of perfect inccsne equality. The value 
of this coefficient ranges from 0.0 - 1.0 where a value of 0.0 and 1.0 
indicates perfect income equality and perfect inequality respectively. 
Table (2.3) presents the Gini Coefficients for Guatemala and other 
countries which gives some basis of comparison. 
15 
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Figure 2.2, Lorenz curves for Guatemala,^ United States and 
Great Britain. 
^sing GAFICA data 
Source: Guatemala: GAFICA. [25]. 
United States: Cline [4]. 
Great Britain: Cline [4]. 
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TABLE 2.3. Gini coefficients of income concentration by country. 
G 
Guatemala 0.58* 
Mexico 0.53^ 
Brazil 0.57^ 
United Kingdom 0.40^ 
United States 0.40= 
Norway 0.36= 
^GAFICA [25] . 
^Cline [4]. 
^Thorbecke and Sengupta [24] . 
The Distribution of Land 
Faced with the fact of a high degree of inequality in the distribu­
tion of income in Guatemala one turns to the question of what factors 
influence the distribution of income in Guatemala. This question, of 
course, would be very difficult to answer completely and indeed could be 
the subject of another dissertation. However, one outstanding character­
istic of Guatemala, which is not unique among Central and Latin American 
countries should shed considerable light on this question. This 
characteristic is the highly unequal distribution of land. 
Distribution of land becomes even more important in explaining the 
distribution of income when one considers that 68.27» and 65.4% of the total 
labor force was employed in agriculture in 1950 and 1964 respectively [5]. 
1 / 
Table (2.4) presents the number and size of farms according to the 
1964 agricultural census [6J. 
TABLE 2.4 Guatemala: number and size of farms, 1964. 
Number of % of Percent Average 
Farm size class farms farms Area of land size 
Less than 0.70 ha^ 85,083 20.0 32,619.2 0.9 .38 
From 0.70 to 6.99 ha 279,797 67.0 607,855.6 17.7 2.17 
From 6.99 to 45.13 ha 43,656 10.0 648,900.2 18.8 14.86 
45.13 to 902.51 ha 8,420 2.0 1,258,545.2 36.6 149.47 
More than 902.51 ha 388 0.9 894,600.4 26.0 2,305.67 
Totals 417,344 100.0 3,442,520.6 100.0 8.25 
^1 ha (hectare) = 2.5 acres. 
Farm sizes are grouped together in a clarification scheme used in 
the Agriculture Census and also United Nations reports. This scheme 
classifies farm size relative to ability to fully employ an average 
farm family productively during the year. The word productively is 
important here because obviously an entire family may work on the finca 
when one man could handle the work alone. In this case the marginal 
productivity of the other family members would be equal to zero. 
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According to this scheme any farm less than 5.99 hectares would 
be classified a subfamily farm, too small to sustain a family (less than 
two laborers).^ Farms of size 7 to 45 hectares are classified as family 
size farms. Farms of size 45.1 to 902.51 and greater than 902.50 hec­
tares are classified medium and large multi-family farms respectively 
[111. 
Subfamily farms, or what will be referred to as the traditional or 
subsistence sector throughout this paper, account for 87.0% of all farms 
while accounting for only 18.6% of the land while 388 or 0.9% of the 
largest fincas possess 26.0% of the land. It is apparent that the 
distribution of land is even more skewed than the distribution of 
income. 
Economic and Cultural Dualism 
The most important economic sector of Guatemala is the export agri­
culture sector which produces mainly coffee, cotton, and bananas. There 
is strong evidence that the prime factor influencing investment in 
Guatemala is the performance of this sector, and has led to Guatemala's 
econonQT being classified as an "export led" economy [7]. Most of the 
There are exceptions to this rule. For example, one vegetable farm 
of one hectare can generally fully employ a family. However, much of 
the traditional agriculture can be characterized as "milpa" farming, 
which is growing mainly corn and squash and beans planted in the rows with 
the corn. Also wheat is grown in many areas and is virtually the only 
"cash crop" of the highland Indian. These crops are less labor intensive 
than vegetable farming and much more common so the classification scheme 
used is probably quite realistic. 
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export products which are produced come from the large plantation type 
farms. It is this group which though relatively small in number takes a 
large share of the land holdings. Over the period of 1950-1966 export 
crop production grew at a rate of 6.6% while production of domestic 
consumption crops grew at a rate of 4.1%. 
It is the existence of this dynamic modem agricultural sub sect or 
existing side by side with the small traditional agricultural subsector 
which enables Guatemala to be classified as the "prototype" of a dual 
economy [7]. With approximately 56% of the population in the subsistence 
agriculture sector and many more extremely poor in the large cities who 
came from this sector because of lack of employment opportunities one 
must conclude that the distribution of ownership of land is an extremely 
important factor influencing the overall distribution of income and 
wealth. According to Adams "whether one is a subsistence fan-ier on his 
own or rented land, an agricultural laborer on a coffee or cotton farm, 
or an upper-sector entrepreneur looking for a prestigious and profitable 
investment, land is the base. One of the major problems of access to 
wealth is simply getting access to land" [l]. 
As in any capitalist economy the distribution of wealth not only 
affects the distribution of income directly through the rate of return 
on wealth but also indirectly through influencing social and cultural 
factors which have an affect on the distribution of income in the longer 
run. It was hypothesized (and accepted) by Manger-Cats [10] 
. . . that most power is concentrated in the hands of those who 
control the land or are intimately connected with this group, and 
that this results in a social order in which primary producers have 
no effective opportunities for decision making or for acquiring the 
capacities for making rational decisions. 
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He concludes 
. . . that the present land tenure structure of Guatemala is part 
of a complex matrix of social and cultural factors which tend 
to obstruct the economic and social development of the country. 
In his study Manger-Cats comes to two important conclusions related 
to the relationship between land ownership and socio-political factors 
which have long-run effects on income distribution: 
The access to public and private services, including education, 
technical services, transportation facilities, credit and the like 
increases with the size of holdings. 
The majority of those with low incomes, little education, 
limited resources and access to few services are politically 
powerless, or at least inactive, particularly at the national 
level but even largely so at the local level...[10]. 
We then have a vicious circle where the distribution of income determines 
access to more wealth particularly land which in turn influences the 
distribution of political power and the means of increasing human wealth 
such as education. Also the access to important factors such as credit 
and technical assistance are affected. These factors then influence the 
distribution of income both in the long and short-run. 
In light of the above arguments it seems reasonable to conclude that 
any policy aimed at improving the lives of all Guatemalans and at bring­
ing about a more equitable distribution of income, at least in the long 
run, will have to ccane to grips with the problems which are associated 
with the land tenure system. 
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CHAPTER III. A METHOD FOR MEASURING THE GROWTH EFFECTS OF 
A MORE EQUA.L DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN GUATEMALA 
The Method 
A three sector linear macroeconomic model is used to measure the 
effects of a more equal distribution of income. The model is basically 
Keynesian with no financial variables.^ All variables are expressed as 
real values in terms of 1958 prices. 
No price adjustment mechanisms are included in the model. There are 
essentially two types of goods, food and nonfood. It is, therefore, 
assumed that the own and cross price elasticities between these two types 
of goods are sufficiently small to warrant the assumption that relative 
movements of prices will have no effect on the real values of the 
variables in the model. Allocation of demand for food between the two 
agricultural subsectors (traditional and commercial) is accomplished in 
the model using parameters which reflect the present marketing structure 
in Guatemala (this will be explained later). Also any effects resulting 
from an increase in the general price level, such as the real balance 
effect, are not taken into account by the model. 
Consumption functions are specified by sector and income level so 
that the marginal propensity to consume can vary according to sector as 
well as income level. A linear programming approach will be used to 
^ot including interest rates in the model should pose no theoretical 
problems because of the financial system in Guatemala. Interest rates are 
fixed by the monetary authority and have not been changed in ten years. 
Therefore, interest rates play no role in discretionary monetary policy. 
No capital market exists where funds for investment can be raised through 
the issue of stocks and bonds. Therefore, any model based on a portfolio 
adjustment mechanism where changes in the money supply affect the relative 
cost of capital and, therefore, investment would not apply in this case. 
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allocate investment and, therefore, savings among the sectors. The total 
amount of savings generated will depend upon government taxation, the 
consumption functions, and the inflow of foreign capital. Investment 
in period t will increase capacity of each sector in the same period 
assuming instantaneous and, therefore, costless adjustment in response to 
increases in demand. 
The objective will be to maximize GDP or a weighted sum of sectoral 
outputs (different weighting schemes will simulate different policy 
emphases for the different sectors). Savings and investment will be 
allocated in such a way as to maximize income while satisfying demand and 
capacity constraints. Allocation of investment and savings not only will 
depend upon the incremental output—capital ratios for the sectors but 
also will depend upon demand for the products produced by the sectors. 
Changing the distribution of income will effect the total amount of 
savings available for investment, the total demand for consumption goods, 
and the composition of consumption demand (at least between, food and 
nonfood goods). In this framework both the savings and demand effects 
will be working simultaneously and the net effects can be observed. 
The trade-off between income in the traditional sector and income 
in the rest of the economy will be measured by using a slightly modified 
ofjective function. 
Let W = 6^ + 62 
where : 
jp 
= production in the traditional sector 
p 
Y^ = production in the rest of the economy 
23 
= constant weight attached to sector i 
also let: 
S 6^ = 1 
Optimizing the model at various values of 6^^ so that the slope 
of the objective function ranges from zero to infinity will trace out 
P P 
the transformation surface or feasible region in terms of and Y^ . 
If the slope of this curve is negative, a trade-off exists and the 
measure of the trade-off will be the slope of the curve or the arc 
elasticity. 
Maximizing GDP and deriving the trade-off curve for some base year 
will result in what will be referred to as base solutions. The results 
of simulated changes in the distribution of income will be compared with 
these base solutions. In order to obtain data for the exogenous variables 
for the base runs data for the year 1964 was chosen. This can almost be 
an arbitrary decision because only comparison of results with the base 
runs is important not the ability to predict actual values of the 
If W can be defined as a total social welfare in Guatemala, then 6. 
is the increment to welfare resulting from a one unit increase in produc­
tion for sector i. Even if the form of the function were correct it would 
be impossible to determine the value of the 6.*s for the society. What 
emerges is the implicit welfare function of tèe people who hold the power, 
and the weights (ô.'s) are determined by their preferences. Because, 
peasants have littîe power or access to power it is likely that the actual 
values of 6^ and ôg would show that ^ 6^. This does not necessarily 
mean that there is a conscious effort to discriminate against the tradi­
tional sector, but the structure of the society and the allocation of 
wealth which have been determined not only by economic forces results in 
this type of weighting scheme. What is implied is that a concerted effort 
by policy makers must be made to shift the weighting structure to favor 
the traditional sector if the gap between income in the traditional sector 
and in the rest of the economy is to be closed. 
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endogenous variables. However, it was felt that since the census data 
was official for 1954, and 1964 was close to the dates of the budget 
studies and other studies used, it would be a reasonable choice. 
In summary, a linear programming model is used to allocate invest­
ment and savings in order to maximize GDP and derive a trade-off curve. 
This is done once with the actual estimates of the parameters to obtain 
the base solutions. Income redistribution experiments are then carried 
out by changing the consumption parameters and by simulating lump sum 
transfers. The effects of these changes and transfers on the optimal 
GDP and the transformation curves are observed. These changes should 
then help answer the questions stated in the introduction: 
(1) What is the net cost in terms of sacrificed overall GDP or 
incoioe in the rest of the economy of increasing output in the traditional 
sector? 
(2) What are the net effects in terms of the savings and demand 
effects of a non-equal distribution of income within sectors? 
Identification of the Sectors 
The model will include three sectors: traditional agriculture, 
commercial agriculture, and non-agriculture. A sector will be more than 
an income and production concept but a cultural one as well. Although 
the lines between these sectors are not distinct, the two agricultural 
subsectors can be delineated geographically. The map shown in Figure 
(3.1) shows five major geographical regions in Guatemala. The north and 
northeast regions are lowland areas consisting of jungle. The approxi­
mate percentage of the total population for this region in 1964 was 3.2. 
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N O R T H  A N D  
N O R T H E A S T  
Uetropolilao C^slenola GULF 
HONOJRAS 
HONDURAS 
EL SALVADOR 
PACIFIC OCEAU 
Figure 3.1. Major geographical regions of Guatemala. 
Source: Adams [l] . 
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This region is relatively unimportant as far as agriculture is concerned. 
The western highlands, which is often called the Indian Highlands, is 
comprised mainly of small land holdings. The majority of the population 
is Indian, and indeed several departments in this region have over 90 
percent Indian populations. The eastern highlands differ from the 
western highlands in that the population density is much less. Instead 
of a predominance of small land holdings, the eastern highlands have a 
much broader spectrum of small, middle-sized, and large producers. The 
percentage of Indians in this region is less than 50 percent of the total 
population in the region. There are, therefore, significant cultural 
differences between these two regions. The coffee piedmont consists of 
an area along the south slopes of the mountain range running through the 
central part of Guatemala. This land is most suited to growing coffee and 
it is here where most of the large coffee fincas are located. It is to 
this region that most of the seasonal migration of farm laborers from the 
western highland occurs. The south coast is tropical sea level land 
where sugar cane and cotton are most important. The remaining region 
consists of metropolitan Guatemala, Guatemala City being the capital of 
the republic [1]. The three sectors of the model will now be rigorously 
defined. It is necessary to delineate the sectors as rigorously as 
possible in order to estimate the parameters of the model for these 
sectors. 
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The Traditional Sector 
The traditional sector is defined as consisting of all families 
who operate farms classified as subfamily size farms, which account for 
about 87 percent of all farms in Guatemala (364,879 farms according to 
the 1964 agricultural census). It will be recalled that subfamily size 
farms are defined to be those less than 7 hectares in size. Most of 
these small farms are found in the western highlands of Guatemala. Indeed 
if one were forced to locate the traditional sector geographically, the 
western highlands would be the most accurate choice both because of the 
high concentration of small farms and also because of the high proportion 
of Indians living in this region. These two factors distinguish the 
western highlands in both an economic and cultural sense. 
In addition to these people another group of families, who have no 
land but would be of the same cultural class, are included in the tradi­
tional sector. These families are officially denoted "trabajadores sin 
tierra" or workers without land who work principally on the large farms. 
There were about 68,700 families in this category in 1964. 
Obtaining an estimate of income per family for this sector is very 
difficult. No data is published officially by the government or its 
agencies so the only information available is from surveys taken by 
individuals or private groups. Sebald Manger-Cats [10] estimates the 
average per family inccane of the minifundista in the western highlands 
at about Q520.00^ per year. This includes income both in kind and in 
specie and also from sources outside the farm. He estimates tha income 
^1 Q (Quetzal) = $1.00. 
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per family for traditional farms on the coastal plain to be about Q967.00. 
Although the average area of the minifundia in the lowlands was nearly 
twice that of those of the highlands, the value of products is about 
three times as high on the coastal farms. He attributes this more 
than proportional difference to better soils and good climatic condi­
tions. However, according to the 1964 census of agriculture there were 
only about 30,000 subfamily size farms in the south coastal region 
accounting for about 12% of the total number of subfamily farms. There­
fore, taking a weighted average based on these weights gives an average 
per family income of Q573 for the sector as a whole (taking into account 
the laborers without land the average would be slightly less). However, 
another study (IDESAC)[14] presents a less optimistic estimate of 
Q258,00 per family for highland Indian families. However, the average 
size of farms in this study was 1.2 hectares while for the former study 
it was 2.14 hectares (1.82 for highlands and 3.23 for coastal plain). 
The national average size for subfamily farms was 1.86 hectares. The 
sample by Manger-Cats seems to be more representative of the actual farm 
size of this sector. Therefore, with the difference in size of farms in 
the two studies taken into account the lower figure given in the IDESAC 
study is probably not inconsistent with the Manger-Cats estimate. For 
purposes of this study the per family income for the traditional sector 
will be assumed to be equal to approximately Q500.00. 
The traditional sector will be assumed homogenous with respect to 
the marginal propensity to consume (i.e., marginal propensity to consume 
will be assumed constant for all levels of income in the traditional 
sector). 
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The Commercial Agriculture Sector 
The commercial agriculture sector will be divided into three sub-
sectors by farm size or income strata. These three subsectors are: (1) 
family size farms, 7.1 - 45 hectares; (2) small multi-family farms, 45.1 -
896 hectares and (3) large multi-family farms, greater than 896 hectares. 
Average per-family income will be assumed to be Q1600.00, Q700.00, and 
Q30,000 for each group respectively.^ Also to be included in the income 
of this sector will be income derived from "produccion pecuaria" which 
includes such products as eggs, milk, wool, honey, and bees wax. Also 
income from cattle and other animals will be included. Because of lack 
of data on the income distribution of these activities we will simply 
assume that income is distributed from these activities in the same pro­
portion as the income from crops. While it is more difficult to locate 
this sector geographically it is safe to say that most of the large farms 
producing export crops are located in the coffee piedmont and south 
coastal regions. 
The Nonagricultural Sector 
The nonagricultural sector will be defined as all nonagricultural 
sectors of the economy including government and services. This sector 
will be divided into ten income strata in accordance with the urban 
budget study referred to earlier [16]. 
^These estimates are consistent with the study by Manger-Cats. 
30 
There are three important interactions which take place among 
these three sectors of the model: (1) seasonal movements of labor from 
the traditional sector (mainly the western highlands) to the large 
commercial faims, in the coffee piedmont or south coastal plains, (2) 
mutual demand for goods produced by each sector, and (3) interregional 
flows of savings. 
Each year more than 200,000 cultivators of small plots supplement 
their incomes by working on the large farms on a seasonal basis [19]. In 
addition to the seasonal workers are the permanent workers which are the 
workers without land and the "mozos colonos". Mozos colonos are permanent 
workers on the large fincas who have been given small plots of land to 
work for themselves in addition to working the large finca. Both of 
these latter groups are included in the traditional sectors. 
According to Schmid [19] there is some complementarity between em­
ployment in the subsistence sector and in the commercial agriculture 
sector especially for the coffee harvest. By complementarity it is meant 
that the seasonal demand for workers by the commercial sector does not 
conflict with planting or harvesting periods in the traditional sector. 
According to Schmid if the average migratory worker has only one 
hectare of land at his disposal, which was the case in his study, he works 
about 52 days on his home farm. This would leave about 300 days per year 
available for nonfarm employment. The workers interviewed in his study 
worked an average of 101 days on the large farms. This would appear to 
leave workers with 150 days for which they do not take employment. If 
this conclusion is correct and if workers are willing to work for longer 
periods of time at the set wage rate, then an assumption of a perfectly 
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elastic supply of labor (at least over a wide range) in this market 
seems justified. To quote Schmid: 
. . .  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  h i r i n g  o f  l a b o r  f r o m  t h e  s u b s i s t e n c e  
farms takes place during the slack season on the farms, the 
supply of labor, in Guatemala can be considered to be unlimited. 
This assumption will be employed in the model. 
The mutual demand relationships and interregional flows of savings 
are of central importance to this study because the distribution of 
income is both affected by and in turn affects these variables. Unfor­
tunately no data exists for these relationships but it is hoped that the 
model add results to follow will shed some light on these relationships. 
The Model 
The variables and parameters specified separately for each region 
are defined as follows : 
Endogenous variables 
= total income for sector i i = T, A, N 
where 
I = traditional sector 
A = commercial agriculture sector 
N = non-agriculture sector 
p 
= total production in sector i 
Y^ 
T = total income received from the commercial agriculture sector 
by agricultural laborers in the traditional sector 
Y^ = total income received by the traditional sector from non-
agricultural sources 
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total number of man days of agricultural labor required by the 
commercial agriculture sector 
total demand of sector j for commodities of type i 
portion of expenditures on food by the nonagricultural sector 
which goes to the nonagricultural sector itself 
total consumption demand for agricultural goods produced by 
the commercial agricultural sector 
total consumption demand for nonagricultural goods 
imports of agricultural commodities 
imports of nonagricultural consumer goods 
imports of investment goods by sector i 
personal disposable income of sector i 
total consumption demand by the _ith sector for food 
total investment demand 
total investment demand by sector i 
total net tax revenue 
total net indirect taxes collected from sector i 
total net direct taxes collected from sector i 
total government savings 
total government savings allocated to sector i 
f'^) = net flew of savings to sector i 
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Exogenous or predetermined variables 
= government consumption of goods and services from sector i 
X^. = exports of goods and services from sector i 
= net government transfers to sector i 
F = net inflow of foreign capital 
^ = capacity output in period t-1 of sector i 
Parameters 
w = average wage rate paid to agricultural laborers working in 
the commercial agriculture sector per man day 
e^ = number of man days of agricultural labor (unskilled) required 
to produce one dollar (in constant dollars) of output in the 
traditional sector 
eg = proportion of total income in the traditional sector which 
comes from nonagricultural sources 
= autonomous consumption expenditures on food by the ith income 
group of the _ith sector 
c^^ = marginal propensity to consume food by the ^ th income group 
= autonomous consumption expenditures on nonfood goods and 
services by the ith income group of the ^ th sector 
c^^ = marginal propensity to consume nonfood goods and services by 
the i.th income group of the _ith sector 
~ proportion of total inccane of sector i which is in income level 
JL 
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3 = proportion of total demand for food by the commercial agriculture 
sector which is satisfied by the commercial agriculture sector 
itself 
s = proportion of total demand for food by the nonagriculture sec­
tor which is satisfied by the ccsmnercial agriculture sector 
a = proportion of total expenditures on food by the nonagricultural 
sector which accrues to the nonagriculture sector itself 
m^ = proportion of agricultural goods consumed which are imported 
m^ = proportion of nonagricultural consumption goods which are 
imported 
m^ = proportion of investment goods which are imported 
t^ = average indirect tax rate 
D 
t = average direct tax rate 
= incremental output-capital ratio for sector i 
The equations 
Total income for the traditional sector is the sum of income received 
from production of crops, from agricultural labor in the commercial agri­
cultural sector, and from nonagricultural activities. 
[1] 
Income from working as an agricultural laborer is given by equation 
[2] where w is the average wage rate per man day worked on a commercial 
farm. 
4 = "4 [2] 
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The total number of man days worked, is assumed to be a function 
of production in the commercial agricultural sector and is given by 
This (equations [2] and [3]) implies a perfectly elastic supply of 
labor from the traditional sector to the commercial agriculture sector. 
This assumption is consistent with the concept of a seasonal labor sur­
plus discussed earlier in the chapter. 
Income received from the nonagriculture sector is assumed to be a 
certain fraction of total income for the traditional sector. This 
relationship, given in equation [4], is not intended to be a behavioral 
function but merely an accounting mechanism to account for the fact 
that a certain percentage of the income of traditional farmers comes from 
nonagricultural sources. To the extent that these traditional farmers 
spend their income differently than their urban counterparts at the 
same level of income, this relationship will make a difference. Other­
wise this income could be left in the nonagriculture sector and there 
would be no net effect on total aggregate demand. 
Equations [5] and [5J are accounting relationships to account for 
the transfer of income from the ccamnercial agriculture and nonagricultural 
sectors, respectively, resulting from the activities discussed above. 
equation [3] where e^ is the man days required to produce a one dollar 
of output (in constant 1958 dollars). 
4 = ^i^f [3] 
[4] 
[5] 
36 
Y, 
N [6]  
We will now assume that output in the three sectors is constrained 
by demand for the produce of each sector. Equations [7] through [9] 
express these relationships. 
Implicit in the above relationships are the assumptions: 
(a) The traditional sector does not export any of its output to 
the rest of the world. 
(b) Imports of agricultural goods are assumed to be competing with 
output produced by the commercial agriculture sector only and not the 
traditional sector. 
(c) All investment goods are produced by the nonagricultural 
sector. 
According to the hypothesis being tested changes in the distribution 
of income will have their primary effect on consumption. Therefore, the 
following consumption functions given below are critical to the analysis. 
These are given by equations [10] through [15]. The form of the above 
consumption functions is important with respect to the distribution of 
income, in each sector designates the income strata of each sector. 
The traditional sector consists of one income group while the commercial 
[7] 
[8] 
[9] 
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agricultural and nonagricultural sectors have 3 and 10 income strata 
respectively. To obtain the consumption function for the entire sector 
the consumption functions for the various income stratum are summed over 
income strata of sector i, and, therefore, reflects the distribution of 
income. Therefore, assuming the distribution population fixed for each 
income distribution. It is through changing the parameters, that 
changes in intrasectoral distribution of income are simulated. 
First, it is observed that the traditional sector consumes most of 
its own output except for some output such as wheat which is sold out­
side the sector. Let us assume that the traditional sector is self-
T 
sufficient in the production of food. Therefore, let C^, the total con­
sumption of food by the traditional sector, be expressed as a residual 
of total production and sales to the other sectors and government. This 
is given by equation [10]. 
Hj , ^ii t:he proportion of total sectoral income found in the fth 
strata, changing the will be equivalent to assuming a different 
4  =  4  -  4  -  4  -  i  [10] 
The remaining consumption equations are given below. 
^ ^ '^ ksi?k 4 = 1, 2, 3 
4 = 1 
i = 1, 2 
4 = 1, 2, 3 
> • • • 9 10 
[14] 
[13] 
[12] 
[11] 
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S ^ ^ ^ 1, 2,..., 10 [15] 
The above consumption functions are for agricultural output in 
general but do not specify from which agricultural subsector (traditional 
or commercial) the agricultural output will be purchased (with the excep-
T T T 
tion of the traditional sector where and = 0). 
Demand for agricultural output is allocated between the two agricul­
tural sectors by the following equations. 
cf = 3 0 ^  3 ^  1 [16] 
= (1-3) [17] 
= e 0 g e ^  1 [18] 
= (1-e) [19] 
Another problem which must be dealt with is the problem of translating 
final demand for agricultural products into actual income to the agricul­
tural sectors. In other words final demand as measured in the data in­
cludes value added by the nonagricultural sector from such nonagricultural 
activities as transportation and retailing. Two simplifying assumptions 
are made. First, it is assumed that demand measured by expenditures for 
food products by the agricultural sectors (both traditional and commercial) 
goes directly to the agricultural sectors themselves. In the case of the 
traditional sector this is realistic in that the producer (or his family) 
markets his own produce in the local market places or the food is consumed 
directly by the family. In the case of commercial agriculture the assump­
tion at least implies that value added to agricultural products if not 
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kept within the same family is at least kept within the sector itself. 
There is also the implication that rural people eat very little "processed" 
foods. This may not be true of the owners of the large fincas who may 
spend all or most of their time in the capital, but they are relatively 
few in number. Second, it is assumed that final consumption demand by 
the nonagricultural sector, or basically the urban sector, can be divided 
into a portion that goes to the nonagricultural sector and a portion that 
goes back to the agricultural sectors. Equations [20] and [21] allocates 
urban demand for food to the nonagricultural and agricultural sectors 
respectively. Equation [20] expresses the portion of demand for food 
which goes to the nonagricultural sector as a constant proportion of total 
demand for food, 
C = 
Therefore, we have for urban demand for products produced by the 
agriculture sector at approximate "farm gate" prices the following relation 
relation. 
- 4 P:] 
The data used to estimate the consumption functions express family 
income excluding direct taxes but including indirect taxes. Consumption 
expenditures include indirect taxes. Therefore y^, y^, y^ are equal to 
gross income minus direct taxes plus transfer payments. This is expressed 
by equations [22] through [24]. 
Yt = + T^ [22] 
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Y, 
N 
[24] 
Equation [22] implies that the traditional sector pays no direct 
taxes. Given the difficulty of collecting the tax from the traditional 
farmers and also considering the level of their income this seems to be 
a reasonable assumption. 
Total investment demand is the sum of investment in the three 
sectors. This is given by equation [25]. 
To account for imports it is specified that the demand for imports 
is a constant proportion of consumption and investment expenditures. 
Further, we will assume that the proportion of total demand for a good 
that is import demand depends on the type of good. We distinguish between 
three types of goods: (1) agricultural goods, (2) nonagriculture consumer 
goods and (3) investment goods. 
Assuming that imports of food do not compete with products produced 
by the traditional sector let 
I 4 + :A + [25] 
C 
'A 
[26] 
so that 
M, 
A 
[27] 
Let total consumption of nonagricultural goods be given by 
[28] 
so that 
[29] 
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The import functions for investment goods are given by equations 
[30] through [32]. 
4 ° -I 4 
^ ° "I ^  P2] 
Indirect taxes and direct taxes are specified by equations [33] to 
[35] and [36] [37] respectively. 
[33] 
4 = & [35] 
T» = [36] 
The following identities express total net taxes and government 
savings respectively. 
= 4 + ^A + 4 + 4 - - T; C3S] 
s = T - [39] 
g n g g g 
Private savings by sector are defined by the following expressions. 
[40] 
< = '^A - - 4 - < - 4 [41] 
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4 ' « - - 4 - < - < - <=1 
Indirect taxes are subtracted out of each of the equations because 
y^, y^, and y^ were not net of indirect sales taxes. 
The programming model allocates total government savings among the 
three sectors. Therefore, let: 
= S [43 ] 
g g g g 
Total gross production in each of the sectors is less than or equal 
to capacity in each sector. Capacity will be determined by the capacity 
of the previous period plus any addition to capacity resulting from gross 
investment in the current period. The increase in capacity resulting 
from investment will be equal to the incremental output-capital ratio for 
each sector multiplied by the total amount of gross investment that takes 
place in that sector. These relationships are expressed by the following 
inequalities. 
i = Qt-l h [44] 
i ^ + Ya ^ A 
^ «t-1 * 
Total imports must be less than or equal to the amount of foreign 
exchange earned by exports plus the net inflow of foreign capital F. 
This is expressed by [47 J. 
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Foreign capital, F, and exports, are assumed to be 
exogenously determined and are not determined by the model. 
There are three sources of savings for the economy as a whole. These 
are (a) private savings expressed by equations [38] to [40], (b) public 
savings given by [37], and (c) net foreign flows of capital F. For a 
particular sector the sources of savings are private savings generated 
within the sector itself, public savings that is allocated to that sector, 
and net inflows of savings from the other sectors. The sum of these net 
flows of savings to the different sectors can be greater than zero by the 
amount of foreign capital inflow. The mechanism by which the model handles 
intersectoral movements of capital will be discussed later. 
Investment in each sector must be less than or equal to the total 
amount of savings available for that sector. Inequalities [46] to [48] 
express this relationship. 
+ sj + (f^ - fp s I^ [48] 
"a - ^ [^9] 
4 + "s + ^ ^ E50] 
The term, f^ - f^, found in each investment constraint requires 
additional explanation. These terms are important because they allow 
intersectoral flows of savings. For example (f^ - f^) is the net flow 
of savings to the traditional sector from the other sectors, from abroad, 
or both. If the term, f^ - f^ is positive, then the net flow of savings 
to the traditional sector is positive. Likewise, if the term is negative, 
then the net flow of savings to the traditional sector is negative, or. 
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savings are flowing out of the sector to the rest of the economy. The 
use of (f^ - f^) instead of a composite variable say, f^ which could be 
either negative or positive is because of the restriction imposed by 
linear programming that all activities be greater than or equal to zero. 
Therefore, when the net flow of savings to a sector is negative, the 
program will choose a positive value of f^ and f^ will not enter the 
optimal basis and f' will enter at a positive level making (f^ - f^) 
negative. 
The sum of the flows of savings to the various sectors must be equal 
to zero plus the net flow of foreign capital to the country. This con­
straint is given by equation [51]. 
(fj - fp + - tp + ^ [51] 
In order to make the model "tight" so that all savings are being 
utilized and that no excess demand or excess savings exist in any market 
or sector, the following equality must hold. 
z Y? = z z ci + Z + Z I. + Z X. - Z H 
i ^ j i ^ i® i ^ ^ i 
- Z i = T, A, N j = T, A, N [52] 
This forces total savings (private, public and foreign) co equal 
total investment. Also, the sum of excess demands for products produced 
by each of the sectors is equal to zero. We added the additional con­
straints of making equation [8 J an equality. Equation [10] forces [7] 
to equality. Therefore equation [9] will be an equality because the 
sum of excess demands must be equal to zero. Further, equations [46] 
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and [47] are forced to be equalities. Therefore, [48] must be an 
equality making the excess demand for savings in all sectors equal to 
zero. 
The model allocates savings and investment among the various sectors 
in a way that maximizes the objective function subject to the total 
level of savings which comes from abroad or is generated by savings 
behavior and taxation policy within the country itself. Because the 
marginal propensities to consume are different for each sector and for 
each level of income within a sector, a change in the distribution of 
income will affect both the total level of savings and the level of 
savings within each sector. This in turn will affect both the total 
amount of investment and also the intersectoral flows of savings required 
to satisfy investment requirements in each sector. The investment require­
ment in a sector is a function of excess demand for goods produced by that 
particular sector. Therefore, a redistribution of income which will change 
both the total amount and the composition of consumption demand will also 
affect both total investment requirements and sectoral investment require­
ments. The model, therefore, captures both the savings and demand effects 
simultaneously. By comparing the results of running the model under the 
assumption of a more equal distribution of income to the "base solutioii" 
results, it will be possible to measure the net economic effects of a 
redistribution of income. 
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Estimation of the Parameters of the Model 
Before beginning the discussion of the estimation of the parameters 
of the model a note regarding the general nature of the problem of 
estimating the parameters of this particular model seems in order. The 
data requirements of the model call for fairly disaggregated data in 
time series form. In general this data does not exist at the level of 
disaggregation required for some data and at no level of disaggregation 
for other data. The parameters were estimated using such sources as 
cross section budget studies for consumption parameters and results of 
studies done by other people using sample data. The basic problem was 
to find reasonable estimates for the parameters which are not only 
reasonable from a "micro" standpoint but, when applied in the model, 
result in estimates of values of the variables, when aggregated together, 
are consistent with national income account data. It was impossible to 
use two stage least squares or other simultaneous estimation techniques 
using data which is consistent with national income data to begin with 
and derive estimates of the parameters which would assure that the model 
be reasonably consistent with the national account data. However, it was 
possible to derive estimates of the parameters of the model which result 
in the model giving results which are reasonably in line with the official 
national account data. 
The consumption functions 
Data to estimate the consumption functions was obtained from two 
budget studies carried out by the Institute de Investigaciones Economicas 
Y Sociales (IIES) at the University of San Carlos in Guatemala City. 
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During September 1966 to January 1967 a rural budget study was carried 
out which had a sample size of 1759 families and consisted of families 
which were defined as agricultural workers [15]. The study included 
rural families with incomes from QIOO.OO to $3000 per annum. In 1969 
a more extensive, in that the sample size was larger and the sampling 
techniques improved, budget study was carried out by the same institute 
and under direction of the same man which included urban families from 
the five largest cities of Guatemala [16] , Guatemala City, 
Quezaltenango, Puerto Barrios, Jutiapa, Esquintla. The study included 
urban families with incomes that ranged from QIOO.OO to more than 
Q10,000.00 per year. 
It was felt that using both of the studies would give a representa­
tive sample of people at all levels of income as well as the rural and 
urban components of the population. 
The basic methodology used to estimate the parameters of the con­
sumption functions by sector and level of income is as follows. It was 
assumed that income in the traditional sector and the bottom sector 
(family size farms) of the commercial agriculture sector was ?pent as 
rural income. Income from the rest of the commercial agricultural sector 
and the nonagricultural sector was assumed to be spend as urban income. 
Therefore, the rural and urban budget studies were used to estimate con­
sumption functions for these two basic groups. The budget studies give 
family consumption expenditures and average income for 23 and 20 income 
groups for the rural and urban studies respectively. Consumption functions 
for food and nonfood were estimated using income and consumption data at 
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the different levels of income giving 23 observations for the rural 
functions and 20 observations for the urban functions. The consumption 
2 functions fit were of the form C = a + by + cy . Since the marginal 
propensity to consume is given by b + 2cy the sufficient condition for a 
falling marginal propensity to consume as income rises is that c be 
negative. However, since the model is linear it was necessary to express 
the quadratic consumption function as a series of linear segments. This 
was done by dividing rural and urban income into income groups correspond­
ing to the different levels of income specified for income distribution 
purposes. The marginal propensity to consume and intercept term was 
calculated at the mean income for that particular income group. This 
resulted in the estimates of c^^ and for all i, j and £. 
The original raw data for the budget studies was not available. The 
consumption and income data were in terms of group averages for each 
income level. This would not necessarily present a problem but in this 
case the number of observations in each group is different. Therefore, 
the model is of the form: 
y = 3 X + Û 
where : 
y and X are group means of the dependent and independent variables 
respectively. 
U is the average error for each group. 
Therefore, if U ~ (0, I 
then (0, V o^) 
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where : 
When the n^ are not the same, heteroscedasticity results and 
ordinary least squares will result in biased estimates of the standard 
errors of the coefficients. To eliminate this problem, weighted least 
squares was used. The variables of the model were transformed by pre-
multiplying by the following diagonal matrix: 
' \ 
/•0-2 0 
The results of fitting the above polynomial using the rural data 
for food and nonfood respectively are given below. The standard devia­
tion of the estimate of a coefficient is given in parentheses below the 
coefficient. The t statistic is reported below the standard deviation. 
For total consumption we have: 
C = 90.36 + 0.9279Y - 0.00014^^ 
(18.07) (.0249) (.000011) 
7.68 19.52 -6.40l 
Since the same independent variable appears in both equations the 
consumption of nonfood goods and services can be found by subtracting 
1 
Indicates the estimate is significantly different than zero at the 
0.01 level. 
50 
the values of the parameters of the consumption function for food from 
the respective parameters in the total consumption function. Therefore: 
C, = 12.50 + 0.4416Y - 0.00013 
N 
The results of fitting the polynominal consumption function for the 
urban data are presented below. 
For total consumption we have: 
C = 46.16 + 1.0299Y - 0.00002Y^ 
(4.53) (0.1182) (0.000008) 
10.18 8.71 2.29I 
For food we have: 
C = 278.49 + 0.2673Y - O.OOOOIY^ 
(50.27) (0.0233) (0.000001) 
5.54 11.49 -5.99I 
Therefore for nonfood we have: 
C„ = 232.33 -f- 0.7626Y - O.OOOOIY^ 
N 
Since the coefficient, c, is significantly different from zero and 
negative in all cases we reject the hypothesis that c is equal to zero 
and that the marginal propensity to consume is constant at all levels of 
income. 
Table (3.1) presents the calculated marginal propensities to consume 
and corresponding intercepts by sectors and income groups within the 
sectors. 
Deriving the marginal propensity to consume food and nonfood goods 
and services for the rural and urban populations and plotting these on 
the same graph indicates some interesting differences in consumption 
behavior between the rural and urban population as well as between groups 
of people and different income levels. Comparison of rural and urban 
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TABLE 3.1. Average income, marginal propensity to consume and autonomous 
consumption expenditure by sector and level of income within 
each sector for food and nonfood per family. 
Sector and income MPC at Y 
_a 
Intercept at Y 
Strata Y Food Nonfood Food Nonfood 
Traditional sector 400.00 .4279 .3376 89.54 33.30 
Commercial agriculture 
Family farms 1,600.00 .2527 .0256 264.74 345.30 
Small multi-family 9,700.00 .0733 .5686 1 ,219.39 708.57 
Large multi-family 30.00 0.01 0.0^ 2 ,064.72 14,306.64 
Nonagricultural sector 
0 - 500 411.50 .2591 .7544 280.17 -230.65 
501 - 1000 787.76 .2516 .7469 284.65 -226.17 
1001 - 1500 1,249.07 .2424 .7377 293.99 -216.83 
1501 - 2000 1,749.77 .2324 .7277 308.93 -201.88 
2001 - 3000 2,441.62 .2185 .7138 338.03 -172.80 
3001 - 4000 3,458.16 .1982 .6935 397.86 -112.96 
4001 - 6000 4,833.14 .1707 .6660 511.78 0.96 
6001 - 8000 6,828.66 .1308 .6261 744.29 233.48 
8001 - 10,000 8,788.73 .0916 .5869 1 = ,047.25 539.43 
10,000 + 13,998.99 0.0^ .4827 1 ,  064.72 1,726.27 
^These represent per family autonomous consumption expenditures. To 
find the intercept for each level of income the estimated number of fami­
lies in each income level was multiplied by the above per family inter­
cepts. 
^MPC = 0 at Y = 13,365. 
^MPC = 0 at Y = 38,130. 
^MPC = 0 at Y = 13,365. 
total marginal propensities to consume is presented in Figure (3.2). 
Comparison of rural and urban marginal propensities to consime food and 
nonfood at various levels of income is presented in Figure (3.3). 
1.0 
Urban total 
Rural total 
300 500 
—I— 
2000 1000 3000 
Figure 3.20 Comparison of rural and urban marginal propensities to consume at various levels of 
Income. 
\ 
1 
Urban nonfood 
Urban food 
Rural food Rural nonfood 
3500 3000 300 2000 1000 500 
Figure 3.3. Comparison of rural and urban marginal propensities to consume food and nonfood 
at various levels of income. 
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From Figure (3.2) it appears that the difference in consumption 
behavior between rural and urban people is at least as great as the 
difference in behavior between people at different levels of income. At 
any given level of income the marginal propensity to consume is higher for 
urban people than for rural people. A glance at Figure (3.3) indicates 
that the difference in total marginal propensities to consume for the 
rural and urban population is mostly made up of the difference in the 
marginal propensity to consume nonagricultural goods. 
To provide a more rigorous test of the hypothesis that the urban 
marginal propensity to consume is greater than the rural marginal pro­
pensity to consume, the urban and rural data were pooled and dummy vari­
ables were added to test for a significant difference in b and c between 
rural and urban populations. 
To test for a shift in the parameter, b, the following equation was 
fit using the pooled urban-rural data. 
C  =  a  +  b Y  +  b ' Y ' + C Y ^  
where: 
Y' = 0 for urban observations 
Y' = Y for rural observations. 
If b' turns out to be significantly greater than zero the null 
hypothesis that the parameter, b, is not greater for rural income than for 
urban income will be rejected. Similarly if b' is significantly less than 
zero, the null hypothesis that the parameter, b, is not less for rural 
income than for urban income will be rejected. The results of fitting 
the polynomial consumption function over the pooled rural and urban data 
are presented below. 
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a = 148.53 t = 3.53 
b = 0.9905 t = 36.93 
h' = -0.2754 t = -4.97 
c = -0.000017 t - -7.73 
b' is significantly less than zero at the 0.001 level of significance 
with 16 degrees of freedom. We therefore reject the hypothesis that the 
parameter, b, is not less for rural income. 
The same procedure was applied to test for a shift in the parameter, 
c, between urban and rural income. The following equation was fit. 
C = a + b Y + C + C' + (Y^)' 
where : 
2 (Y )' = 0 for urban observations 
2 9 
(Y ) ' = 1 for rural observations. 
The results of fitting this equation are presented below, 
a = 60.89 t = 1.82 
b = 1.0224 t = 38.75 
c = -0.000019 t = -8.64 
c' = -0.00016 t = -5.34 
c' is significantly less than zero at the same level of significance 
leading to the rejection of the hypothesis that the value of c is not 
less for rural than for urban income. 
Since MPC = b Y + 2 c Y and b and c seem to be less for rural income, 
we conclude that the marginal propensity to consume is smaller for rural 
than for urban people at any given level of income. 
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There are three factors which alone or in combination may lend 
credence to this result. The first has to do with the structure of the 
rural sector itself. Approximately 88% of all farms in Guatemala were 
classified as subfamily size in 1964 [6]. The distribution of the popu­
lation should correspond roughly to the distribution of farms. The 
largest share of this population is made up of highland Indians whose 
consumption behavior is determined at least partly by tradition. For 
example, Indian women in the highlands pretty much still wear their 
traditional costumes. Corn is still the staple as it has been for 
centuries. Sol Tax in his classic study of a Guatemala Indian economy, 
"Penny Capitalism" [22] makes the observation that while among the Indians 
the richer Indians live better than the poor, the differences are "strictly 
limited — i.e., in degree not proportional to wealth and always within 
the bounds of the culture". More specifically: 
... variations among rich and poor (Indians) are held strictly 
within bounds. The richer families could certainly afford to 
plaster their adobe-brick house; they do not. They could 
afford windows which they do not have. They could have lime-
mortar or even brick floors, but they do not. They could have 
raised fireplaces (as the Government demands) and do not. And 
so on. They lack such things not because they are unfamiliar 
with them - for Ladino homes that they frequent have them -
but because they do not want them... it is obvious that so-
called "cultural factors", as opposed to economic, are 
involved [22]. 
The second factor which may help to account for the lower MPC for the 
rural sector has to do with what Rogers calls the "Mud Wall Complex" [17]. 
According to Rogers ". . . when a subsistence farmer achieves a higher 
level of living than his peers, he consumes his material gains in a non-
veblenian style". Rogers quotes G. M. Foster who suggests a reason for 
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mud walls: "People who threaten the community by acquiring or appearing 
to acquire more than their traditional share are discouraged from persist­
ing in this action by gossip, slander, backbiting, fear of witchcraft, and 
physical violence or threat of bodily harm" [17]. It is not within the 
scope of this paper to determine whether this view is accurate in the case 
of the Guatemala peasant. However, enough evidence (see Rogers [17]) of 
this attitude has been found in other countries to give the idea some con­
sideration in understanding the consumption behavior of Guatemalan 
peasants. 
These two possible explanations for the observed consumption behavior 
between rural and urban populations should at the very least indicate the 
need for an interdisciplinary approach to problems of development in 
countries with a high proportion of the population engaged in traditional 
agriculture. In dealing with problems in these areas the economist should 
look to the sociologists and anthropologists before going ahead and 
applying received economic theory with its usual assumptions concerning 
the "rational economic man". The success of development programs such as 
the one suggested by Thiesenhusen where the size of the domestic market 
is to be increased by developing the traditional or subsistence sector 
will depend on knowledge that is specific to the traditional farmer. 
While this program may be successful in the long run, economic development 
will lag behind cultural development or change. (It should be noted that 
while a peasant's desire for a television set may be an indication of 
cultural change it is not necessarily an indication of cultural develop­
ment if development implies an improvement.) 
The third factor which may be contributing to the observed difference 
in consumption behavior between the urban and rural population has to do 
with the availability of goods and knowledge of new products. A look at 
any Guatemalan map with reasonable detail reveals literally hundreds of 
towns in the highlands with only a dirt path linking them to the outside 
world. A peasant who moves to the city is faced with a much greater 
variety of goods to purchase than perhaps would be found in his home 
market. The urban dweller is not only faced with a wider selection of 
goods, but his attitude toward purchasing them may change as a result of a 
"demonstration effect". 
It was mentioned earlier that income received by owners of multi-
family size farms would be assumed to be consumed as urban income. This 
assumption seems consistent with the factors discussed above. These 
people have high mobility and many of them live in the city much or all 
of the time. It seems reasonable to expect that their consumption 
habits would be better depicted by the urban consumption function rather 
than the rural consumption data which was derived from interviewing mostly 
campes inos. Further the range of income of the rural sample only went 
as high as S3000.00 which would not include the income levels of the 
owner of the multi-family size farms. 
The incremental output-capital ratios 
The incremental out put-capital ratio, for sector i is defined 
as the increment to output resulting from one unit of investment. It is 
different from Zhe marginal product of capital in that the lat.:er assumes 
other factors constant while the incremental output-capital ratio assumes 
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that other factors may be increased along with capital in accordance to 
least cost combination of resources. In mathematical terminology ^ 
is the incremental output-capital ratio while the marginal product of 
capital is given by the partial derivative rather than the total deriva­
tive or ^  . 
The incremental output-capital ratio for the traditional sector was 
derived using production coefficients estimated by Gollas [8]. Gollas 
fit Cobb-Douglas production functions to survey data obtained from owners 
of farms of family size or smaller. The average size of farm was three 
hectares. 
Given Q = f (K, L, N) then: 
f = MPP^  + MPP^ g + 
where : 
= the marginal productivity of capital 
MPP^ = the marginal productivity of land 
MPPjj = the marginal productivity of labor. 
We will assume that the traditional sector can not increase total land 
holdings. Therefore, = 0. According to Gollas "one may observe, on 
the whole, indications of inefficient use of family labor among Guatemalan 
highland Indians. The efficiency indexes suggest that too much family 
labor is being used in farm activities". Given this information we will 
assume that MPP^ is also equal to zero. Therefore the incremental output-
capital ratio for the traditional sector will be assumed to be equal to 
the marginal productivity of capital. Gollas estimated the marginal 
productivity of capital to be 0.40. Therefore, - 0.40. 
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The incremental output-capital ratios for the remaining sectors 
(commercial agriculture and nonagriculture) were estimated by fitting the 
following equations for each sector, 
\ ^ ^t-l i = 0, 1. 2. 3 
The equation was estimated with investment in the current year as 
the independent variable and also lagged one, two, and three years. 
Unfortunately, investment data broken down into investment in agriculture 
and investment in nonagriculture was only available for nine years giving 
only eight degrees of freedom. On the basis of t tests and goodness of 
fit statistics estimates of y with investment in the current year were 
chosen. The estimated incremental output-capital ratios for the commer­
cial agriculture and nonagricultural sectors are presented below with 
their standard errors and t values. 
Y, = 0.747 Yw = 0.4770 
(0.2612) ^ (0.0398) 
2.9 12.0 
is significantly different from zero at the 0.02 level of signif­
icance while ^  is significant at the 0.0001 level. 
Estimates w, e, and e^ 
The average wage rate, w, earned by agricultural laborers working in 
the commercial agriculture sector was estimated by Schmid for different 
plantation crops, coffee, sugar cane, and cotton [18]. Taking the 
weighted average with the weights corresponding to the proportion of the 
unskilled labor force employed in the production of each crop, an average 
of Q0.88 per man day was arrived at. 
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is the number of man days required to produce one unit of output 
(measured in constant prices) in the commercial agricultural sector. 
Using data provided by Schmid, e^ for export crops was estimated to be 
approximately 0.43 [18]. Using Table 3.5 of [7] the proportion of export 
crops to total commercial production was estimated to be 0.57. It was 
assumed that e^ = 0 for nonexpert crops which implies that all seasonal 
laborers work only on fincas producing export crops. This, of course, is 
not completely accurate but it is true that the large fincas are almost 
exclusively export crop oriented, and it is these fincas which hire the 
great bulk of seasonal labor. This assumption, therefore, is probably 
not too extreme. At any rate it should be recognized that L may be 
underestimated because of this factor. The final estimate of e^ was 
taken to be the weighted sum of the value of e^ for export and nonexpert 
crops. The weights were the proportion of export crops and nonexpert 
crops in total commercial agricultural production respectively. The 
estimated value of e^ is therefore taken to be 0.2438. 
According to Gollas [8] income from employment in nonagricultural 
activities makes up on the average about 28% of total income of the 
subsistence farmer. Therefore e^ was estimated to be equal to 0.28. 
Estimates of {3, g, g 
3 is the proportion of total demand for food by the commercial agri­
culture sector which is satisfied by the commercial agricultural sector 
itself. We will make the assumption that the commercial agriculture sec­
tor is self-sufficient and purchases no food from the traditional sector. 
T h e r e f o r e ,  l e t  3 = 0 .  
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e is the proportion of total demand for food by the nonagricultural 
sector which is satisfied by the commercial agriculture sector. Wheat 
is the major cash crop of the traditional sector. Since com is the main 
staple of this sector most of the wheat is sold outside of the sector. 
We will assume that the nonagricultural sector consumes this wheat. 
According to Table 3.5 of [7] this accounts for 4.5% of total domestic 
consumption of agricultural products consumed by the nonagricultural 
sector. We, therefore, let e = 0.045. 
a is the proportion of total expenditures on food by the nonagricul­
tural sector which actually accrues to the nonagricultural sector itself. 
This measures value added by the nonagricultural sector as a proportion 
of the total value of agricultural production at final demand prices. 
A crude measure of a is given by taking the ratio of the difference 
between total agricultural production net of exports and the value of 
final consumption of food (domestic) and the value of final consumption 
of food. The estimates for a for the years 1958-1966 ranged from 0.6320 
to 0.6423. Of was therefore assumed to have a constant value of 0.64. 
Estimates of m^, m^, m^ 
The import parameters were obtained from simple ratio estimates 
using national account data. Ordinary least squares regression was not 
used because looking at the estimates for these parameters revealed that 
they changed over time but were fairly constant for several years at a 
time. Since the model would not be used for forecasting, it was felt 
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that more realistic estimates would result from choosing the values of 
the parameters for the years close to the year for which the model simu­
lations would be carried out (in our case 1964). 
The estimates for the import parameters are given below, 
m^ = 0.03 = 0.27 m^ = 0.40 
Estimates of t^ and t^ 
The average indirect and direct tax rates were estimated using 
generalized least squares resulting in the following functions. 
t^ = 0.0727 Y = 0.9794 
(0.0027) d = 1.72 
26.73 
t^ = 0.0206 y = 0.8361 
(0.0024) d = 1.59 
8.45 
where : 
t^ = total indirect taxes 
t^ = total direct taxes 
Y = gross domestic product. 
Table (3.2) presents a summary of the parameters and their estimates 
(excluding the consumption parameters which are presented in Table 
(3.1) ) . 
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TABLE 3.2. Summary of parameters and their estimates.^ 
Parameter Estimate 
YT 0.40 
\ 0.75 
0.48 
w 0.88 
0.24 
0.28 
0 0.0 
e 0.045 
a 0.64 
0.03 
0.27 
0.40 
tl 0.07 
t» 0.02 
^he distribution parameters, i, £ are presented in other 
sections. 
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CHAPTER IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The Base Solution: Maximization, of GDP 
The programming model used can be expressed in the following summary 
form: 
Maximize C'Y subject to 
AY ^ X 
Y ^ 0 
where : 
C = 1 X n row vector of weights used in the objective 
function 
Y = n X 1 vector of endogenous variables defined for the 
model 
X = n X 1 vector of constants corresponding to the values 
of the exogenous variables and constants in the model 
A = m X n matrix of constant coefficients corresponding to 
the parameters of the model. 
Maximizing GDP subject to the constraints imposed by the model results 
in the following values of important endogenous variables. These are 
presented in Table (4.1). 
When possible, base run predictions were compared with actual values 
for 1964 to check the reasonableness of the estimates. These are com­
pared in Table (4.2), 
Given the piece-meal manner in which the parameters of the model 
were estimated, the agreement between actual and predicted values of 
the important variables of the modfel seems to be acceptable. 
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TABLE 4.1. Values of selected endogenous variables for the base run. 
Maximization of GDP 
Variable Value for base run 
(Millions of Q 1958 prices) 
GDP Q 1311.40 
Yt 199.96 
250.10 
837.62 
1116.15 
< 232.14 
< 884.21 
I 135.11 
4 
0.0 
^A 
20.55 
114.56 
-33.07 
^A - ^A' 
-56.57 
^N 
109.44 
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TABLE 4.2. Comparison of selected base run estimates 
of the selected variables for 1964. 
with actual values 
Variable Predicted Actual 
1116 .15 1085, .25 
G: 232 .14 244, .26 
4 
884, .21 824. 21 
I 135. 11 157. ,79 
^A 
20. 55 20. ,6* 
114. 56 107. 78* 
398. .83 384. 76 
912. 58 913. 75 
GDP 1311. 40 1298. 51 
Private investment only. 
Two comments concerning the results of the base solution maximi­
zation of GDP seem required. First, the model allocates investment 
among the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors in a way very similar 
to the actual situation. Second, the interregional flew of savings is 
from the traditional and commercial agricultural sectors to the non-
agricultural sector. Since investment is zero in the traditional sector 
this implies that all net savings generated within the traditional sector 
are transferred out of the sector. While this may or may not be 
realistic it should be remembered that this is an "optimal" solution 
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based on the demand for the output of the traditional sector and the 
incremental output-capital ratio which is the lowest of all the sectors. 
The implied average saving rate for the traditional sector is about 16.5 
percent while for the economy as a whole it is about 8 percent. If these 
figures are even close to the actual values, traditional views about sav­
ings behavior of peasants seem to be questioned at least in the case of 
the Guatemalan "minifundista". According to the data collected by Manger-
Cats the average savings rate for his sample of families with less than 7 
hectares of land corresponding to our classification for the traditional 
sector was about 15.5 percent [10]. This lends some support to the above 
results. 
This optimal solution also assumes that the financial system is de­
veloped to the extent that savings can be readily transferred from one 
sector to another. While the actual situation in Guatemala at the present 
time would indicate this to be true for the commercial agriculture and 
nonagricultural sectors there is some question as to the e::tent tradition­
al farmers use the banking system. According to Tax the Indians in his 
village did not use banks. More specifically, "A few wealthy families are 
known to have considerable cash on hand, kept in chests at home (banks are 
not used); in two or three cases it might amount, at times, to hundreds of 
dollars. But the rich seem generally to invest their funds in land, and 
are rich rather in the value of property owned than in cash" [22]. 
In order to simulate the case where no savings could flow out of the 
traditional sector, we repeated the base run under the restriction that 
f^ = 0. The results of this run are compared with the original results 
in Table (4.3). 
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TABLE 4.3. Comparision of solutions under the assumption of free flow of 
savings from the traditional sector and zero savings flow. 
Values under assumption Values under assumption 
Variable of free flows of zero flows 
GDP Q 1311.40 Q 1305.65 
199.96 216.82 
250.10 249.12 
837.62 818.95 
N 
1116.15 1113.16 
c| 232.14 239.15 
cj 884.21 874.01 
I 135.11 131.16 
0.0 34.92 
I, 20.55 11.60 
A 
114.56 84.65 
f^ - -33.07 0.0 
f. - f/ -56.57 -97.39 
A A 
f., - f„' 109.44 117.19 
N N 
The result of this experiment shows a negligible loss in GDP (0.4%) 
resulting from forcing the solution away frcsn the original unrestricted 
optimum. However, income in the traditional sector increased by 8.4% 
while income in the commercial agriculture and nonagricultural sectors 
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fell by .4% and 2.2% respectively. The loss in savings resulting from 
the fall in income in the nonagricultural sector has to be made up from 
the commercial agricultural sector. This is indicated by the fact that 
net flows of savings to the nonagricultural sectors increased while 
investment in that sector fell. Also it should be noted that the savings 
which are generated within the traditional sector are forced into invest­
ment in that sector and results in increased income in that sector be­
cause of the increased capacity. It is also interesting to note that 
the increased income in the traditional sector comes mostly at the 
expense of the nonagricultural sector. 
Under the assumptions and estimates of the parameters up to this 
point, the optimal solution for maximizing GDP shows excess savings 
being generated in the agricultural sectors and flowing to the nonagri­
cultural sector. There is zero net investment in the traditional sector. 
Derivation of the Trade-off Curve 
The trade-off curve was derived using the objective function defined 
in the previous chapter (i.e., w = 5^ + 62 , where + Y^).^ 
Table (4.4) presents the results of each solution corresponding to the 
particular values of 6^ and 
distinction between income and production in a sector exists in 
this model because of the fact that the traditional sector earns income 
from activities outside the traditional sector. Production was used in 
the objective function because, while income in the traditional sector 
could be increased by growth of the commercial agriculture sector through 
the employment of agricultural labor, a more important concept would be 
an increase in income in the traditional sector due to increased produc­
tion in that sector. 
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If the increment to the slope is sufficiently small, increasing the 
value of the slope of the objective function from zero to infinity will 
trace out the feasible region over which the objective function is 
maximized. The trade-off curve is the portion of the curve defining 
the boundary of the feasible region which has a negative slope. The 
results of deriving the base run trade-off curve indicate only two dis­
tinct optimal solutions exist for this model. However, any linear 
combination of these two solutions could be optimal given a nonlinear 
P P 
objective function. The trade-off curves for and Y^ - Y^ are 
presented in Figures (4.1a) and (4.1b), respectively. The slope and arc 
elasticity for the respective curves are also given in the same diagrams. 
According to the results presented in Table (4.4) an increase in 
total income of the traditional sector of about 24 percent will result 
in a 1.4 percent loss in GDP and a loss of 6.9 percent for the other 
sectors of the economy combined. In terms of production an increase of 
p 
42 percent in Y^ will result in a 4.9 percent decrease in production for 
the other sectors combined. In termu of per-unit change it appears that 
in order to increase total income in the traditional sector by one 
Quetzal (1 Quetzal = 1 dollar) GDP would be sacrificed by Q.34 and a 
P P 
one Quetzal increase in Y^ will require a sacrifice of Q1.34 in Y^. 
A transformation curve was also derived under the restriction that 
fg/ = 0 (i.e., savings were not allowed to flow out of the traditional 
sector). The results of this exercise are presented in Table (4.4b). 
Figures (4.2a and (4.2b) permit a comparison between the trade-off curve 
derived under the two alternative assumptions. The original curves 
derived with no restriction of f^' are given by the broken lines. 
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Figure 4.2a and 4.2b. Trade-off curves between the traditional sector and the rest of the 
economy in terms of total income and total production, respectively: 
Comparison of assumptions concerning f^ . 
TABLE 4.4a. Results defining trade-off curve between the traditional sector and the rest of the 
economy •• lîase Run. 
Solution 6, 6; GDP ^ I I., \ 
1 1.0 0.0 1292.68 254.86 1037.81 116.74 1176.54 115.97 101.02 14.95 0.0 74.59 -60.57 5.78 
2 0.8 0.2 No change in solution 
3 0.6 0.4 No change in solution 
4. 0.4 0.6 1311.40 199.96 1111.45 75.73 1235.67 135.11 0.0 20.55 114.56 -33.07 -56.57 109.44 
5 0.2 0.8 No change in solution 
6 0.0 1.0 No change in solution 
TABLE 4,4b. Results defining trade-off curve between the traditional sector and the rest of the 
economy - f^' = 0, 
solution 6, GDP ^ "r ' 4 
1 1.0 0.0 1292.68 254.86 1037.81 116.14 1176.54 115.97 101.02 14.95 0.0 74.59 -60.57 5.98 
2 0.8 0.2 No change in solution 
3 0.6 0.4 No change in solution 
4 0.4 0.6 1305.65 216.82 1088.83 88.14 1217.51 129.23 31.03 18.83 79.38 0.0 -57.80 77.60 
5 0.2 0.8 No change in solution 
6 0.0 1.0 No change in solution 
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It can be seen from the figures that forcing all savings generated 
in the traditional sector to that sector limits the size of the feasible 
region and places a lower limit on growth of the econony outside the 
traditional sector but does not change the slope of the trade-off curve. 
The Redistribution Experiments 
Having obtained the base run results we now are ready to proceed 
with the redistribution experiments. 
Experiment No. 1 
The first experiment will consist of lump sum transfers to the 
traditional sector at the expense of the remaining sectors. The net sum 
of the transfers will be equal to zero, and the amount taken from the 
commercial agriculture and nonagricultural sectors will be proportional 
to the respective share of and in Two sizes of lump-sum trans­
fers will be assumed in order to see if the results are proportional or 
non-proportional to the size of the income transfer. It was estimated 
that to increase family income by QIOO.OO in the traditional sector would 
require a transfer of approximately Q43.4 million. 
Therefore, for experiment No. lA let: 
A Tj = 43.40 
A T^  = -9.94 
A = -33.46 
It was also estimated that to double per-family income in the 
traditional sector would require a transfer of about Q200.00 million. 
Therefore for experiment No. IB let: 
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A = 200.00 
A = -45.80 
A = -154.20 
The results of these two experiments are presented in Table (4.5). 
TABLE 4.5. Results of experiments lA and IB compared with the Base Run, 
Maximization of GDP 
Variable Base Run Experiment lA Experiment IB 
GDP 1311.40 1319.20 1347.34 
199.96 242.51 396.05 
250.10 237.95 194.11 
837.62 814.76 732.26 
1116.15 1105.66 1067.54 
< 232.14 229.03 218.27 
4 
884.21 876.63 849.27 
I 135.11 153.47 219.72 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
^A 
20.55 16.64 2.54 
114.56 136.82 217.18 
^ " ^T -33.07 -62.36 -168.05 
^ A - fA' 
-56.57 -90.09 -82.38 
^ N -
109.44 172.24 270.23 
„P & 912.58 923.26 961.83 
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Experiments lA aaoii IB produce some interesting results. According 
to the results presenntedL in Table (4.5) a lunq) sum transfer of Q43.4 
and Q200.00 million f::zom the nontraditional sectors to the traditional 
sector will increase • CD? by 0.6% and 2.7% respectively. Total private 
consumption fell by 0 0,9%. and 4.4% respectively. Total investment, how­
ever, increases but oionly in the nonagricultural sector where investment 
increases by more thaîintîie fall in investment in commercial agriculture. 
This is due to a totalil increase in available savings. Total production 
in the nonagricultura'-t increases due to increased investment in that 
sector. Since the denanaad constraint of nonagricultural production is 
binding and consmnptio.on <3einand for nonagricultural goods falls, invest­
ment demand is the st: lus to growth in this sector under this type of 
redistribution scheme in spite of the high inçort content of investment 
goods. It seems cleaurtliat the gainers from a lump sum transfer to the 
traditional sector wouuld be the traditional farmers in terms of increased 
disposable income and the nonagricultural sector both in terms of in­
creased capacity due tfto the investment in that sector but also from the 
increased investment ô<Eeinand. 
Results of repeatftitig experiments lA and IB under the restriction 
that no savings are aHLlowed to flow out of the traditional sector, are 
presented in Table (4... 6). 
Lump sum transfemrs of Q43.4 and Q200.00 million to the traditional 
sector under the restrriccion of f^' = 0 result in an increase of GDP 
of 0.4% and 0.8% respes<tively. This is in contrast to 0.6% and 2.7% 
respectively for the utatestricted runs. Total private consumption 
demand fell by 1.27. ann'<i4.8% in contrast to 0.9% and 4.4% for the 
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TABLE 4.6. Results of experiments lA and IB compared with Base Run under 
the restriction l' = 0. 
Variable 
Base Run 
(Under restriction) Experiment lA Experiment IB 
GDP 
,d 
4 
"A 
f„ - f„ 
- ^A' 
& ' 
1305.65 
216.82 
249.12 
816.66 
1116.34 
243.10 
873.24 
129.23 
31.03 
18.83 
79.38 
0.0 
-57.80 
77.60 
895.69 
1310.27 
276.97 
236.08 
774.54 
1102.98 
251.83 
851.15 
147.21 
63.32 
13.34 
70.55 
0.0 
-90.52 
110.32 
891.45 
1316.43 
484.34 
188.97 
621.78 
1062.51 
276.34 
786.17 
193.85 
162.46 
0.0 
31.39 
0.0 
-76.60 
96.40 
872.66 
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unrestricted runs. The fall in consumption came at the expense of demand 
for nonagricultural goods because the demand for food increased owing 
to the fact that increased output resulting from investment in the 
traditional sector allowed an increase of food consumption in that sec­
tor. (It should be remembered that the traditional sector was assumed 
to be self sufficient in food and that no food would be purchased from 
the commercial agricultural sector). 
While the results of the experiments do not change qualitatively 
with the additional assumption of f^' = 0, the net effect on GDP is less 
while the demand effect (consumption) is about the same. This implies 
that the restriction effects the optimal flow of savings and, therefore, 
the savings effect. 
Conclusion 
The combined demand and savings effects of a lump sum transfer of 
income from the rest of the economy to the traditional sector is to in­
crease GDP while total private consumption falls and savings and, there­
fore, investment increases. Keeping all savings in the traditional 
sector doesn't change the slope of the trade-off curve but limits the 
size of the feasible region. 
Experiment No. 2 
Experiment No. 2 consisted of simulating an improvement in the distri­
bution of income within each sector such that the distribution within 
each sector corresponded to the income distribution of England. This 
involved changing the vector of s in the consumption functions for 
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each sector. is the proportion of total income found in income 
level JL of sector i. If we assume that the distribution of families 
remains constant the increasing for one income level and decreasing 
it for another will represent a distribution from the latter level to 
the former. 
Table (4. 7) presents the results of experiment 2 in comparison with 
the Base Run. 
Improving the distribution of income within sectors increases 
total consumption demand by about 1.3% while total investment falls from 
Q135.il million to Q121.70 million or by about 10%. The net effect on 
GDP is negligible (an increase of 0.07%). 
The trade-off curve was also derived using this distribution. 
Figure (4.3) shows the trade-off curve for the base run and the trade­
off curve derived under the assumptions of experiment 2. Comparison 
of the curves shown in Figure (4.3) indicates that the effect of imposing 
a more equal distribution of income on each sector has little or no 
effect on the slope of the trade-off curve but limits the size of the 
feasible region due to the fall in available savings. 
Conclusion 
Redistribution of income within sectors increases total private 
consumption and decreases investment. The net effect on GDP is negligible 
indicating that the savings and demand effects net out. The slope of the 
trade-off curve is unaffected but the size of the feasible region is 
diminished. 
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Figure 4.3. Trade-off curves for Base Run (broken lines) and for experiment 
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TABLE 4.7. Results of experiment No. 2 and Base Run compared. 
Variable Base Run English Distribution 
GDP 1311.40 1312.36 
199.96 206.13 
250.10 266.20 
Y^ 837.62 816.47 
1116.15 1130.58 
c| 232.14 253.70 
884.21 876.88 
N 
I 135.11 121.70 
h: 
0.0  0 .0  
20.55 48.98 
Ijj 114.56 72.72 
- f^' -33.07 -37.12 
f^ - f^' -56.57 -49.06 
f-, - f-/ 109.44 105.98 
N N 
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Experiment No. 3 
Experiment 3 consisted of simulating the combined effects of a 
redistribution of income between sectors and within sectors. More 
specifically a lump sum transfer of Q43.4 million will be carried out 
while the English distribution of income is imposed on the individual 
sectors. The results of this experiment are given in Table (4.8). 
TABLE 4.8. Results of experiment 3 and Base Run compared. 
Variable Base Run Experiment 
GDP 1311.40 1319.78 
4 199.96 248.42 
< 250.10 253.36 
4 837.62 794.19 
1116.15 1119.77 
c: 232.14 249.79 
4 884.21 869.98 
I 135.11 139.94 
4 0.0 
0.0 
:A 
20.55 43.86 
114.56 96.09 
f^ - f^ -33.07 -66.24 
fA - -56.57 -82.71 
109.44 168.75 
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The results of experiment 4 show that the net effect of both a 
intersectoral and a intrasectoral redistribution of income along the 
lines specified is a .6% increase in GDP, a .3% increase in consumption 
and an increase in investment of about 3.5%. 
Conclusion 
The effects of a lump sum transfer to the traditional sector and a 
redistribution of income within sectors are in opposite directions with 
the transfer of income between sectors having the greatest net effect. 
This of course depends on the size of the lump sum transfer, but it is 
clear that the differences in consumption and saving behavior are greater 
between the traditional sector and the rest of the economy than those 
differences in consumption behavior within sectors due to different levels 
of income. 
Experiment No. 4 
In this experiment the effect of an autonomous increase in total 
savings in the form of a transfer from abroad is examined. A trade-off 
curve is derived under the assumption of a Q30.0 million increase in 
foreign capital inflow, F. The results of this experiment are presented 
in Table (4.9). The trade-off curves for this experiment are shown in 
Figure (4.4). The results indicate that an autonomous increase in 
capital from abroad shifts the trade-off curve up and to the right such 
that the slope of the curves remain constant. With an increase in foreign 
capital GDP will increase, but the range over which output and income for 
a sector may increase at the expense of other sectors will also increase. 
However, the rate at which this trade-off occurs will not change. 
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Figure 4.4. Trade-off curves for Base Run (broken lines) and for experiment 4 
TABLE 4.9, Trade-off curve derived from experiment 4. 
S
o
l
u
t
io
n 
^2 t^ "t "r i in v^a' v^n' 
1 1.0 0.0 273.56 1032.33 129.67 1176.23 149.37 134.84 14.53 0.0 105.30 -60.87 5.57 
2 0.8 0.2 No change in solution 
3 0.6 0.4 No change in solution 
4 0.4 0.6 200.27 1130.62 75.73 1255.16 174.92 0.0 22.00 152.92 -38.40 -55.53 143.93 
5 0.2 0.8 No change in solution 
0.0 1.0 102.30 1163.53 4.80 1251.04 185.80 0.0 24.51 161.29 -48.83 -53.74 152.57 
^This solution called for excess capacity in the traditional sector. We will restrict the 
sectors to produce at full capacity. Therefore, this solution was eliminated. 
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Experiment No. 5 
Up to this point it has been assumed that the traditional sector is 
self sufficient and does not purchase food from the commercial agricul­
ture sector. This implies that a transfer of income to the traditional 
sector will not increase consumption of food. While it is reasonable to 
expect that the marginal propensity to consume food would be low once 
the traditional farmer reached a certain level because their diet is 
prescribed largely by tradition [5], it would be interesting to see 
what the result would be if the traditional sector were allowed to con­
sume more food than they produce. To employ this assumption equation 
[10] of the model is replaced by [10a] and [lOb] which are given below. 
sented in Table (3.1). 
Both GDP maximization and derivation of the trade-off curves are 
repeated under these new assumptions. Also both a lump sum transfer and 
imposing the English distribution of income within sectors were carried 
out and the results were compared with both the original base run and the 
base run derived under the new assumption. The results of this experiment 
are presented in Tables (4.10) and (4.11). The trade-off curves derived 
with and without the new assumption are presented in Figure (4.5). 
The result of imposing this consumption function for food upon the 
traditional sector is an increase in GDP of Q91.0 million, an increase 
in total private consumption demand of about Q35.0 million, and a decrease 
[10a] 
T T T 
[lOb] 
The estimates for the consumption function given in [10b] are pre-
TABLE 4.10. Original Base Run and results of experiment 5. 
Experiment GDP Y^ 
Original base run 1130.40 199.96 250.10 837.62 1116.15 232.14 
Base run under new 
assumption 1322.01 218.88 299.47 780.17 1151.77 296.55 
Lump-sum transfer 
of Q43.4 million 1323.58 263.06 291.55 745.47 1152.18 311.75 
English distribution 
of income 1297.99 212.15 281.91 780.97 1161.19 312.96 
TABLE 4.11. Results defining trade-off curve under the new assumption, 
experiment 5. 
Solution «2 ÏI Yr 4 4 
1 1.0 0.0 220.32 1101.06 76.92 1244.46 
2 0.8 0.2 No change in solution 
3 0.6 0.4 218.88 1103.12 75.73 1246=28 
4 0.4 0.6 No change in solution 
5 0.2 0.8 No change in solution 
6 0.0 1.0 No change in solution 
89b 
I lA ^N~^N 
884.21 135.11 0.0 20.55 114.56 -33.07 -55.57 109.44 
855.32 109.97 0.0 107.75 2.22 11.26 5.73 2.82 
840.43 111.32 0.0 111.32 0.0 1 00
 
-22.27 42.91 
848.27 76.73 0.0 76.73 0.0 12.64 -29.99 37.15 
I lA VSr' V^A' 
109.71 2.99 106.72 0.0 13.95 4.99 .86 
No change in solution 
109.96 0.0 107.75 2.21 11.26 5.73 2.82 
No change in solution 
No change in solution 
No change in solution 
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Figure 4.5, Trade-off curve for original Base Run (broken line) and for experiment 5. 
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of total investment of about Q25.0 million. Total consumption of food 
increased while demand for ncaagricultural consumer goods fell. The 
major result is that savings have decreased to the point that there are 
no excess savings generated in any sector so no interregional transfer of 
capital occurs. 
The results of the income redistribution experiments are somewhat 
different than before. While a lump-sum transfer of income from the rest 
of the economy to the traditional sector caused a net increase in GDP, 
which was the result obtained before, a more equal distribution of income 
within sectors causes GDP to fall, where GDP rose under the same experi­
ment before. The composition of demand is much different. In this case 
the demand for food is much higjier relative to the demand for nonfood 
goods and services. The critical difference in this case is that savings 
are allocated to the traditional sector, not for investment purposes but 
for consumption purposes. The combined effect of the savings and demand 
effect is to decrease GDP by 1,8 percent. 
A look at the trade-off curves derived in this experiment reveal 
that savings are limited to the extent that essentially only one optimal 
feasible solution exists. This is because there are limited savings to 
transfer from one sector to the others and, therefore, no way to increase 
income in one sector at the expense of the other sectors. 
Conclusion 
This experiment indicates the importance of the estimates of con­
sumption parameters and the assumptions concerning the consumption 
behavior of the traditional sector. In the former experiments it was 
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indicated that the traditional sector was a source of savings, and given 
the right incentives and help these savings could be used to develop that 
sector or could be used in the rest of the econony (if savings could be 
transferred out of the traditional sector). In this case (experiment 6) 
the traditional sector requires credit or savings from the rest of the 
economy to meet the consumption demand in that sector. In the former case 
the development problem was one of efficient use of available resources 
(savings), while in the latter case it is one of the total availability 
of resources (savings). 
Summary of Results 
The results of this study can be divided into two categories; 
those that have to do with the trade-off between income in the traditional 
sector and in the rest of the economy and their results coming from the 
redistribution experiments. The results show that a policy designed to 
favor the traditional sector by channeling savings into that sector at 
the expense of the rest of the economy will cost Q0.34 in terms of GDP 
for every Ql.OO increase in income in the traditional sector. In terms 
of income in the rest of the economy the cost of a Ql.OO increase in 
income in the traditional sector is Ql,34. In percentage terms a one 
percent increase in income for the traditional sector will cost 0.06 
percent and 0.28 percent in terms of GDP and income in the rest of the 
econon^ respectively. The effect of simulating a more equal distribution 
of income both through lunç-sum transfers and improving the distribution 
of income within the sectors is solely on the total amount of savings 
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which would be available for investment purposes and not upon the slope 
of the trade-off curve. 
The effect of a lump-sum redistribution of income from the rest 
of the economy to the traditional sector is to increase GDP while 
total private consumption falls and savings and investment increase. 
The net effect on GDP of a redistribution of income within sectors so 
that the distribution of income corresponds to the English distribution 
of income is negligible but total private consumption does increase 
while savings and investment fall. 
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, ISSUES 
AND AREAS F(®. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
Summary and Implications for Policy 
The results of this study indicate that traditional farmers in 
Guatemala are savers and that their marginal propensity to consume is 
less than the MPC or urban dwellers. The view that peasants will spend 
almost all of an increase in income on consumer goods appears to be false 
in the case of Guatemala. This conclusion is particularly relevant with 
respect to "national market" arguments such as the one espoused by 
Thiesenhusen [23]. It is true that in a country where approximately 50 
percent of the population does not participate in the money economy to 
any great extent increasing income for those people will increase the 
size of the market for nonagricultural products. However, it should be 
realized that this effect may be smaller or at least require a longer 
time to develop than expected. 
The results also indicate that a cost is attached to diverting 
savings to the traditional sector for the purpose of increasing produc­
tion through investment. Of course there is no way to tell how signifi­
cant this cost is. It may be that this is a reasonable price to pay to 
develop the traditional sector. At any rate, policy makers should be 
aware of the potential cost of diverting resources (savings) to the 
traditional sector. It should be pointed out that the cost in terms of 
GDP of using savings in the traditional sector rather than in the rest of 
the economy results from the fact that savings are being diverted from 
sectors with relatively higher incremental output-capital ratios than 
95 
the traditional sector. Savings are, therefore, less efficient in terms 
of increasing capacity in the traditional sector than in the other sec­
tors of the econcmy. However, it should be remembered that the incremen­
tal output-capital ratio for the traditional sector was calculated using 
production functions derived from data which embodied the present tra­
ditional level of technology. This point was made by Schultz [20] whose 
hypothesis is that the rate of investment is low in the traditional 
agricultural sector because the level of technology is so primitive that 
the return to investment is low. If new technology is applied to tra­
ditional agriculture which is specific^ to this type of agriculture, then 
it is conceivable that investment can be as productive in the traditional 
sector as in the commercial agricultural sector. 
The effects on the trade-off curve of increasing the incremental 
output-capital ratio for the traditional sector to make it equal to the 
incremental output-capital ratio for the commercial agricultural sector 
were measured using the model. The results are compared with the original 
base solution in Figure (5.1). The trade-off curve for the original 
base solution is represented by the dashed lines. 
Increasing the productivity of investment in the traditional sector 
yields two important results. First, the slope of the trade-off curve in 
terms of income or production is significantly less than for the original 
solution. This means that the economic costs of diverting savings to 
the traditional sector are less in terms of the effects on the rest of 
^It is obvious that taking the technology which is used on the large 
coffee or cotton farms and applying it directly to the small plots in the 
highlands would result in failure. 
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the economy. With respect to GDP the results are dramatically different. 
In this case GDP rises as savings are diverted to the traditional sector 
from the rest of the econcmy. The second result is that savings are 
more efficient in the traditional sector while not being less in the 
other sectors. 
The overall effect is the same as when the overall supply of savings 
increases (i.e., the curve shifts out away from the origin). The range 
over which income can be increased in the traditional sector at the 
expense of the other sectors, therefore, increases. 
The economic cost of any policy aimed at improving the distribution 
of income with respect to the traditional sector versus the rest of the 
economy is a function of the relative levels of technology. In other 
words merely making credit available to the traditional farmers without 
a corresponding program to increase productivity may result in economic 
costs which are unacceptable to the policy makers. 
It has been implicitly assumed that increasing productivity in 
the traditional sector is a technical problem and that the farmers would 
be able to market their produce if they increased their production. At 
the present time traditional farmers bring their produce to the local 
market on their backs and in many cases only dirt paths connect him to 
the market place. This type of marketing system is bound to limit growth 
of income in the traditional sector. The implication for policy is that 
the government should take an active part in improving the marketing sys­
tem in the highlands. This can include everything from building new 
roads to encouraging or setting up marketing cooperatives. 
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Some Important Issues and Areas for Further Research 
An extremely important assumption which has been made throughout 
the study is that traditional farmers will respond to economic incentives 
and adopt new technology to increase output. The success of any program 
for development of the traditional sector depends on a knowledge of the 
motivations, values, and attitudes of the traditional farmers in Guatemala. 
It has been the experience in other countries that action programs de­
signed to stimulate development among subsistence farmers have frequently 
failed because of limited knowledge about them [26], Because we are deal­
ing with a "subculture of peasantry" an interdisciplinary approach to 
this problem should be taken. Economists, sociologists, and anthropolo­
gists can all make important contributions in developing policies and 
programs for development of the traditional sector. One such important 
contribution has been made by Sol Tax [22]. Tax made a detailed study of 
one village in the highlands of Guatemala during the years 1936 to 1941. 
Although the study is old, one who is familiar with the village or other 
parts of the highlands is struck by the appearance that there has been 
so little cultural change. Also Schultz in his important book, "Trans­
forming Traditional Agriculture" [20], (published in 1964), uses Tax's 
work as one of two case studies to test his hypotheses. Tax named his 
book "penny capitalism" because this title best characterized the economy 
of the village which was studied. Tax's well documented thesis is that 
the highland Indians in this village are capitalists, but on a micro­
scopic scale. His contention is that given the state of technology on 
these small farms the Indian farmer is allocating his resources in such 
a way as to maximize output. To put it in Tax's words: 
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The Indian is perhaps above all else an entrepreneur, a 
businessman, always looking for new means of turning a penny. 
If he has land enough to earn a good living by agriculture as 
such, he is on the lookout for new and better seeds, fertilizers, 
ways of planting; and always new markets. 
He observes that vendors know exactly how much they can sell an 
item for in order not to take a loss and also the maximum price which 
can be expected to receive on a particular day in a particular market. 
He notes that the difference in price of a given product between two 
spatially distinct markets was seldom more than the cost of transportation 
between the markets. Indeed anyone who has bargained with an Indian lady 
for vegetables or handicrafts would be very slow to conclude that these 
people do not have "business minds". Tax even documents a conversation 
where knowledge of the concept of "comparative advantage" is implied. 
Several men were discussing the fact that another town was considered to 
have superior onion seeds. One man in the group suggested that they write 
to the minister of agriculture and ask him to stop the other town from 
growing onions. Another man argued that the people in the other town 
would do the same and ask that the Panajachenos, people from (Tax's 
village) plant no more cucumbers (in which they had an advantage). 
. . .  h e  a d d e d  h i s  v i e w s  t h a t  b u s i n e s s  a n d  f a r m i n g  a r e  f r e e ,  s o  
that what a town plants is not a matter for laws, and that a 
town has more of a certain crop than others because it produces 
better there. 
It is possible to hear a similar conversation among businessmen in the 
United States today. 
In summary, the import of Tax's (and Schultz's) thesis is that 
traditional farmers will respond to incentives and will adopt new methods 
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of production. This implies an optimistic outlook with respect to the 
possibilities for development of the traditional sector. 
However, it is only fair to point out that the Guatemalan case 
may be an exception to the rule with respect to this optimistic picture 
of the Guatemalan minifundista. Rogers [l7] attempts to "synthesize what 
is presently known about the motivations, values, and attitudes of sub­
sistence farmers". His review of the literature reveals a pessimistic 
picture of peasants. He suggests several characteristics which appear 
to be fundamental to the subculture of peasantry. All of these if true 
of the Guatemalan peasant would be constraints on development. Following 
is a list of ten central elements in Rogers subculture of peasantry. 
1. }6itual distrust in interpersonal relations. 
2. A lack of innovât ivenes 5. 
3. Fatalism. 
4. Low aspirational levels. 
5. A lack of deferred gratification. 
6. limited time perspective. 
7. Familism. 
8. Dependency upon government authority. 
9. Localiteness. 
10. A lack of empathy. 
No attempt will be made to go into each one of these elements but 
two of these have particular relevance to the question of whether or not 
peasants will respond to economic incentives and adopt new techniques if 
given the opportunity. First, is the element second on the list, "a lack 
of innovâtiveness". According to Rogers, peasants generally lack 
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innovativeness in their reaction to new ideas. One reason for this is 
that they avoid risk. One can say that the lack of innovativeness among 
peasants is due to lack of scarce economic resources. Peasants are poor 
and cannot afford to adopt new technology which requires a cash outlay. 
This, however, does not explain (according to Rogers) why peasants are 
also reluctant to adopt innovations which are economically costless but 
potentially profitable. Rogers contends that Tax's penny capitalists are 
exceptions in the subculture of peasantry. The second important element 
is a "lack of deferred gratification". The import of this element is 
that peasants are not savers but prefer to consume in the present rather 
than save for the future. The evidence he cites to support this conten­
tion is the great amount of alcohol consumed by peasants. This evidence 
indicates that peasants are typified by inp-lse gratification rather than 
the deferred gratification pattern. 
It is clear from the implications of these two views (Tax and Rogers) 
that a resolution of these questions concerning the attitudes and moti­
vations of peasants is necessary for any development program in the high­
lands to be successful. Because the Rogers study is an attempt to gener­
alize and the Tax study—is specific to Guatemala the balance would have 
to be in favor of the more optimistic picture of Guatemalan peasants 
presented by Tax. Also the results of this study with respect to the 
marginal propensity to consume do not support Rogers' conclusions that 
peasants are not savers. An example of the importance of knowing the 
attitude and motivations of people affected by a policy can be given in 
the area of credit policy. The IDESAC Study [14] presents the results of 
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a sample of 264 peasant families concerning use of credit. Eighty-two 
percent of the families interviewed did not obtain credit. When asked why 
they did not obtain credit 5.5 percent of those who did not obtain credit 
reported that they did not do so because the interest rate was too high; 
13.4 percent did not have the necessary collateral while 81.1 percent of 
all those who did not obtain credit did not do so because they said they 
did not know what role credit could play in increasing production and they 
were not willing to take the risk. They stated that a good harvest not 
only depended on the man but also on the weather and other factors outside 
their control. The avoidance of risk would appear to support Rogers. 
However, not wanting to take a risk when it is not known how much is to 
be gained does not seem to be uneconomic behavior and indeed would be the 
rational behavior of a risk averter. The implication for credit policy 
is that for such a policy to succeed attention must be given to an area 
of educating the farmer to the uses of credit and how best to use it to 
increase production. Also, and not of lesser importance, risk must be 
minimized for the peasant farmer. This would not only include reasonable 
rates of interest and payments but also collateral requirements which if 
the harvest fails will not wipe out the farmer's assets. For example, no 
peasant is likely to risk his land because once he has lost his land he 
has no more means of support except working for other peasants at 
extremely low wages or on the large plantations which would probably mean 
his having to leave the highlands. This means that the government would 
probably have to bear if not all, most of the risk in making credit avail­
able to the traditional sector. This would need to be done whether the 
credit came frcaa private sources or frcsa the government itself. 
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